‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات Britain. إظهار كافة الرسائل
‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات Britain. إظهار كافة الرسائل

الأربعاء، 10 مارس 2021

المؤرخ عيسى بلومي: استراتيجيات ونقاط ضعف إمام الثلاثينيات والأسباب الاقتصادية للحركة الجديدة وولاية الكثيري

 (2018) عيسى بلومي والكتاب



في مقابل معاهدتهم في عام 1925 ، ضمنت إيطاليا سوقًا لأسلحتهم وخبرة مهندسي الطرق في اليمن. الطرق التي كانوا يبنونها ، والتي غالبًا ما تكون امتدادًا للطرق التي وضعها العثمانيون بالفعل ، أعطت الإمام في النهاية الإمكانيات اللازمة لوقف المشاريع الموازية التي كانت تويتشل الأمريكية تتابعها ، بما في ذلك بناء ميناء في المخا ، وفي التخفي ، المسح. من أرض يعتقد رجال روكفلر أنها تنتج النفط.

لقد عمل الأمريكيون بهذه الطرق التي أعطت الإمام يحيى وأبنائه ترددات. ربما بدوا قلقين للغاية لتأمين موطئ قدم من شأنه أن يجعلهم أثرياء شخصيًا. حدد الإمام شريكًا أكثر موثوقية في الإيطاليين ، كافأه على مشاركتهم المبدئية في امتياز البنزين والحق الحصري في البحث عن النفط اليمني الذي أراده الأمريكيون بشدة.

أدت محاولات الأمريكيين الفاشلة لإغواء الإمام إلى انتقالهم إلى المملكة العربية السعودية ، مما مكنهم بعد ذلك من طرد البريطانيين تدريجياً من شرق المملكة العربية السعودية. بحلول نهاية الحرب العالمية الثانية ، أدى إنشاء "مملكة" بديلة إلى نوع جديد من الاقتصاد الرأسمالي.


استمر نفوذ الإمام في النمو شرقاً إلى مناطق مأرب ذات الكثافة السكانية المنخفضة (أو الموسمية).

إن قدرة الإمام على جسر الخلافات التي تفصل بين هذه الأنظمة المستقلة للغاية والتي اعتمد عليها نظامه تعني في النهاية أن التحالف السعودي البريطاني لا يمكنه السيطرة على اليمن الشمالي. وكانت النتيجة أن البريطانيين والأمريكيين اضطروا للجوء إلى تكتيكات جديدة. ولأن الوهابية السعودية لم تستطع إخضاع النخبة الثقافية اليمنية بالكامل ، فقد حاولوا استغلال الهدنة الموقعة في النهاية مع البريطانيين في الثلاثينيات. من خلال التوقيع على هذه المعاهدات ، ربما يكون يحيى قد أشار إلى نقطة ضعف تسببت في حدوث تعقيدات سياسية في المستقبل. ظهرت الشكوك حول الإمام في الولاءات المتضاربة في لحظات حاسمة عندما كانت للتحالفات أهمية استراتيجية. بعد ذلك كان هناك صراع داخلي دائم.

تكشف الهدنتان الموقعة في شمال اليمن مع البريطانيين ووكلائهم السعوديين في عام 1934 عن ضعف كبير وتشير إلى أن الدولة اليمنية تفتقر إلى السلطة في العديد من المناطق التي حكمتها. كما تركت الهدنة مع السعودية الأراضي الحدودية لجيزان ونجران وعسير تحت سيادة غامضة. أصبح من الصعب بشكل متزايد الحصول على عائدات الضرائب من هذه المناطق. بالإضافة إلى ذلك ، تم إعادة توجيه قدر كبير من التجارة المحلية ، التي كانت في حد ذاتها مصدرًا للإيرادات الضريبية ، باتجاه الشمال بعيدًا عن الأسواق اليمنية. لكن الأهم على المدى القصير هو حقيقة أن خسارة "عسير" للسعوديين قوضت مصداقية الإمام بين العديد من أخطر دوائر الحلفاء.

وفقًا لمصادر محلية ، في غضون أشهر من النقل الرسمي للسيادة على نجران وعسير إلى السعوديين ، بدأ المستعمرون النجديون في طرد السكان الأصليين ، أولاً عن طريق سرقة الأراضي الرئيسية ثم تقويض الشركات المحلية من خلال تفضيل التجارة حصريًا مع أولئك الذين ينتمون إليها. قلب السعودية. أثرت النتائج على المجتمعات اليمنية الشمالية وتهمشت التجار الآخرين المقيمين في نجران وعسير التي تحتلها السعودية الآن.

أدى تراجع القوة المحلية إلى إعادة ترتيب الولاءات في معظم مناطق صعدة وحجة. ودفعت هذه القضايا بدورها الكثيرين إلى التفكير في عزل الإمام على الفور ووضع شقيقه الأصغر عبد الله أو حتى ابنه أحمد مكان يحيى.


ومع ذلك ، فقد نجا نظام الإمام. 

 التحالف السعودي البريطاني لا يمكن أن يهيمن على شمال اليمن. كانت النتيجة أن البريطانيين والأمريكيين اضطروا للجوء إلى تكتيكات جديدة. ولأن الوهابية السعودية لم تستطع إخضاع النخبة الثقافية اليمنية بالكامل ، فقد حاولوا استغلال الهدنة الموقعة في النهاية مع البريطانيين في الثلاثينيات. من خلال التوقيع على هذه المعاهدات ، ربما يكون يحيى قد أشار إلى قابلية التأثر التي تُرجمت إلى تعقيدات سياسية في المستقبل. تُرجمت الشكوك حول الإمام إلى ولاءات متضاربة في اللحظات الحاسمة عندما كانت للتحالفات أهمية استراتيجية. أقترح أن تُترجم فكرة الضعف هذه إلى صراع داخلي دائم.

أتاحت التوترات المحلية للبريطانيين فرصة أخرى في مواجهة النفوذ الأمريكي والإيطالي المتزايد. في الوقت الذي عانى فيه اليمنيون الشماليون من الاضطرابات الناجمة عن وابل مستمر من المضايقات البريطانية والسعودية ، كان عدد من المحاورين الانتهازيين يهتمون بالشكوك حول مؤهلات يحيى كإمام. 

استخدم العميل البريطاني في اليمن هذه الحيلة داخل معسكرات الموالين للإمام لتعزيز المصالح البريطانية.

ما ألهمته هذه التحديات في النهاية هو الأشكال الفريدة للتحالفات السياسية والاقتصادية. أصبحوا أساس التحالفات الديناميكية التي تسمح لليمن الشمالي بالبقاء مجموعة مرنة ومستقلة من الأنظمة السياسية حتى اليوم.

من أجل التنافس مع الإمام في اليمن ، لجأ الكادر الصغير من العملاء البريطانيين العالقين في عدن إلى التوفيق بين المجتمعات المختلفة ومصالحها المباشرة. كان جوهر الاستراتيجية هو حشد تأثير الشركاء المستفيدين الذين ازدهروا من خلال علاقاتهم عبر الوطنية بحضرموت. كان يُنظر إلى فكرة السماح (أو عدم السماح) للمواطنين الأثرياء بمواصلة جني الأموال داخل الإمبراطورية البريطانية على أنها أفضل طريقة لتهدئة المناطق المضطربة خارج مدينة عدن الساحلية. كان الضباط القلائل المكلفون بالحفاظ على الهدوء في جنوب اليمن بحاجة إلى تعاون الشتات اليمني أكثر من العكس.

كان هذا بالتأكيد هو الحال بالنسبة للعائلات التجارية القوية التي عملت معها السلطات البريطانية لفترة طويلة جنبًا إلى جنب في جنوب شرق آسيا. عملت إحدى العائلات التي تتخذ من سنغافورة مقراً لها ، على وجه الخصوص ، في منزلهم الشرقي في حضرموت مع وضع أن الموارد البريطانية كانت متاحة لتلبية احتياجاتهم الاستراتيجية. بعبارة أخرى ، كانوا حكام دولتهم المستقلة وشركاء مؤقتين مع البريطانيين. في مقابل التعاون مع البريطانيين ، توسعت القبضة التجارية لسلالة الكاف على أسواق المنسوجات والعقارات في سنغافورة. في المقابل ، كان من المتوقع أن يقدم رب الأسرة ، السيد أبو بكر الكاف ، الأموال للحفاظ على دولة الكثيري التي حكمها.

Kathir is at the northeast inside the purple area. Map: 1967-1990 

كان أي عمل بريطاني مركزي صعبًا ، لأنهم اضطروا للتعامل مع الحضرميين المستقلين الذين كانوا يتمتعون بنفس القوة في سنغافورة والجزيرة العربية. أدى عدم وجود مظهر القوة في حضرموت إلى عرقلة تحصيل الضرائب.

تجاوزت الإيرادات التي حققتها جمعية الكاف السنغافورية أي قيمة نسبية أنتجها المسؤولون في عدن

غالبًا ما اختلف البريطانيون في عدن مع أولئك الموجودين في حضرموت.

رأى الإمام يحيى وأبناؤه نزعة السكان المحليين للالتفاف على اللوائح البريطانية لتحصيل الإيرادات. سيقضي أحفاد الإمام نصف القرن التالي في شراكة مع السكان المحليين الذين يبحثون عن نفوذ على نظام العولمة.

كان البريطانيون محبطين بسبب افتقارهم إلى النفوذ في شمال اليمن. كانت المجموعة الكبيرة من اليمنيين الذين يعيشون في مصر هي الاستراتيجية البديلة. كانت مصر بالفعل مركز المكائد المحلية اليمنية في الحرب العالمية الأولى. وشكلت مصر ساحة جذابة بشكل خاص لتنمية مقاومة الإمام. كانت الأهداف الأساسية هي الأعداد الصغيرة من اليمنيين الشماليين الذين سيشكلون  في النهاية حركة الاحرار اليمنيون.

كان العديد منهم من عائلات التجار الأقوياء وملاك الأراضي الذين تضرروا بشدة من أحداث عام 1934. بدأت الحركة عام 1935.


كتاب تاريخ عن الحركة


وصل العديد من الأمريكيين إلى هذا التدافع على النفوذ في هذه المنطقة في هذا الوقت وكان أداة دبلوماسية حاسمة لليمنيين.أصبحت الأنشطة البريطانية في شبه الجزيرة العربية وفي الخارج واضحة بشكل متزايد لحكومة الإمام. لجأ الإمام إلى التكتيك الراسخ المتمثل في تعبئة التحالفات الخارجية لتكون بمثابة ثقل موازن

 يمكن لليمنيين تحليل والتوسط في الطموحات الأمريكية الفردية التي ساعدت في تأمين تلك العقود المربحة. أوقف هذا هدف بريطانيا لتغيير النظام.

تركز العديد من الكتب حول هذه المنطقة على عبد الناصر في مصر كنقطة انطلاق بين الاختلاف في استراتيجيات بريطانيا وأمريكا. لكن قصة اليمن أظهرت أن خلافاتهم بدأت حتى قبل ذلك.

في الختام ، لعب الإمام دور أمريكا والدول الأوروبية الأخرى ضد بعضها البعض واستغل غطرستها لصالحه.

الثلاثاء، 23 فبراير 2021

تقول "أوكسفام" إن مبيعات الأسلحة البريطانية تطيل أمد الحرب السعودية في اليمن


تأليف: دان صباغ

تاريخ النشر: ٢٢ فبراير ٢٠٢١

British Arm Sales Prolonging Saudi War in Yemen, says Oxfam

 يقول نشطاء إن صادرات المملكة المتحدة ، بما في ذلك معدات التزود بالوقود جوًا ، ستطيل من الصراع


اتهمت أوكسفام الحكومة البريطانية بإطالة أمد الحرب في اليمن من خلال السماح بتصدير معدات إعادة التزود بالوقود جوًا تخشى أن تستخدم لمساعدة القوات الجوية السعودية في القيام بقصف عشوائي في البلاد.

تم ترخيص التكنولوجيا للرياض في الصيف الماضي عندما تم رفع القيود المفروضة على الأسلحة ، إلى جانب 1.4 مليار جنيه إسترليني من المبيعات الأخرى ، ويمكن استخدامها لمساعدة الطائرات الحربية في القيام بمهام أطول في وقت يتصاعد فيه الصراع.


قال سام نادل ، رئيس السياسة والمناصرة في منظمة أوكسفام: "بما أن الولايات المتحدة دعت إلى إنهاء الصراع في اليمن ، فإن المملكة المتحدة تتجه في الاتجاه المعاكس ، حيث تكثف دعمها للحرب الوحشية التي تقودها السعودية من خلال زيادة مبيعات الأسلحة ومعدات التزود بالوقود التي تسهل الضربات الجوية ".


دعت المنظمة الخيرية البريطانية كلا الجانبين إلى تبني وقف إطلاق نار عاجل ، ودعت المملكة المتحدة إلى وقف جميع صادرات الأسلحة التي يمكن استخدامها في الصراع. تدعي المملكة المتحدة دعم السلام في اليمن. وأضاف   Sam Nadel  أنه يمكن أن يبدأ فورًا بإنهاء بيع جميع الأسلحة التي قد تُستخدم ضد المدنيين وتفاقم الأزمة الإنسانية.


في وقت سابق من هذا الشهر ، قالت إدارة بايدن الجديدة في الولايات المتحدة إنها ستوقف مبيعات جميع الأسلحة إلى المملكة العربية السعودية التي يمكن استخدامها في "دعم العمليات الهجومية". وقالت إيطاليا إنها أوقفت مبيعات الصواريخ للمملكة قبل أيام قليلة.


لكن المملكة المتحدة قاومت الضغط لتحذو حذوها مع تفاقم الوضع الإنساني ، في صراع يعود إلى عام 2014 وتسبب في مقتل ما يقرب من ربع مليون شخص بشكل مباشر وغير مباشر.


Workers in the Yemeni capital Sanaa search through debris at a warehouse after it was reportedly hit in an air strike by the Saudi-led coalition on 2 July 2020 (AFP)



في الأسبوع الماضي ، حذر ممثلو الأمم المتحدة من أن الحرب قد شهدت "منعطفًا تصعيدًا حادًا" في إحاطة لمجلس الأمن - وأن 5 ملايين مدني "على بعد خطوة واحدة فقط من المجاعة".

وافق الوزراء البريطانيون - وزير الخارجية ، دومينيك راب ، ووزيرة التجارة الدولية ، ليز تروس - على زيادة صادرات الأسلحة إلى المملكة العربية السعودية في الربع الثالث من عام 2020 ، بعد أن خلصوا ، بعد مراجعة بتكليف من المحكمة ، إلى أنه يكن هناك " حوادث متفرقة ".


بلغ إجمالي الصادرات 1.4 مليار جنيه إسترليني على الأقل ، وشملت تصدير "معدات إعادة التزود بالوقود المحمولة جوًا" والمكونات ذات الصلة بموجب ترخيص تصدير مفتوح - بالإضافة إلى ما يقرب من 700 مليون جنيه إسترليني من مكونات القنابل و 100 مليون جنيه إسترليني من صواريخ جو - أرض.


اتُهم التحالف الذي تقوده السعودية - الذي يعتمد على المعدات التي يوفرها الغرب - مرارًا وتكرارًا بتنفيذ قصف عشوائي منذ دخوله الصراع في عام 2015 ، مما أسفر عن مقتل وجرح وتشريد المدنيين.


وبحسب مشروع بيانات اليمن ، الذي يتتبع التفجيرات ، فإن 10٪ من 125 غارة جوية للتحالف سجلت في كانون الثاني / يناير استهدفت مواقع مدنية و 13٪ أصابت أهدافًا عسكرية ، في حين لم يتم حساب الباقي حتى الآن. على مدار الحرب ، قُتل ما يقدر بنحو 8750 مدنيًا في الغارات الجوية.


حوالي 80٪ من الضربات الجوية التي نفذها التحالف بقيادة السعودية استهدفت هدفًا على الأرض في منطقة قتال. من خلال التزود بالوقود ، عادة بعد الإقلاع بوقت قصير ، يمكن للطائرات أن تتسكع في منطقة القتال لفترة أطول بحثًا عن الأهداف.

الاثنين، 15 فبراير 2021

وافقت المملكة المتحدة (بريطانيا) على مبيعات أسلحة بقيمة 1.9 مليار دولار للسعودية منذ رفع الحظر في عام 2020

نشرت 9 فبراير
Translated from the article "UK approved $1.9bn of arms sales to Saudi Arabia since ban lifted" published by Al Jazeera.

 وقعت المملكة المتحدة على صادرات أسلحة بقيمة 1.4 مليار جنيه إسترليني (1.9 مليار دولار) إلى المملكة العربية السعودية بين يوليو وسبتمبر من العام الماضي بعد رفع حظر على مبيعات الأسلحة - وهي خطوة وصفها النقاد بأنها "غير أخلاقية" وسط الحرب المستمرة في اليمن.

جاء نشر الأرقام من قبل وزارة التجارة الدولية البريطانية يوم الثلاثاء بعد أيام من إعلان الرئيس الأمريكي الجديد جو بايدن أن بلاده تنهي كل دعم "للعمليات الهجومية" من قبل تحالف عسكري تقوده السعودية يقاتل المتمردين الحوثيين في اليمن ، بما في ذلك " "مبيعات الأسلحة ذات الصلة

وأثار الإعلان دعوات متزايدة للمملكة المتحدة - الحليف الرئيسي للولايات المتحدة - لفعل الشيء نفسه ، لكن المسؤولين البريطانيين رفضوا حتى الآن أن يحذوا حذوها.

دخل وقف المملكة المتحدة السابق لمبيعات الأسلحة إلى المملكة العربية السعودية حيز التنفيذ في يونيو 2019 بعد أن أصدرت المحكمة العليا قرارًا تاريخيًا يجبر المسؤولين على وقف المبيعات مؤقتًا وسط مخاوف من استخدام الأسلحة في انتهاك للقانون الإنساني الدولي.

خلصت مراجعة حكومية لاحقة إلى وقوع "حوادث متفرقة" لانتهاكات محتملة من قبل القوات السعودية في اليمن ، لكن "لا يوجد خطر واضح" لوقوع انتهاكات جسيمة في المستقبل. أعلن المسؤولون في يوليو 2020 أن المملكة المتحدة ستستأنف مبيعات الأسلحة إلى المملكة العربية السعودية - التي تعد أكبر مشتر للأسلحة في المملكة المتحدة - بعد نتائج المراجعة.

وانتقد نشطاء مناهضون لتجارة الأسلحة المبيعات ووصفوها بأنها "صادمة" وقالوا إن الأرقام "توضح تصميم حكومة المملكة المتحدة على مواصلة توريد الأسلحة بأي ثمن".

"لقد لعبت الأسلحة البريطانية الصنع دورًا مدمرًا في الهجمات التي قادتها السعودية على اليمن ، والأزمة الإنسانية التي أوجدتها ، ومع ذلك فقد بذلت حكومة المملكة المتحدة كل ما في وسعها للحفاظ على تدفق مبيعات الأسلحة" ، قالت سارة والدرون ، المتحدثة باسم وقالت الحملة ضد تجارة الأسلحة (CAAT) في بيان يوم الثلاثاء.

وقال والدرون من CAAT "الآن حتى الولايات المتحدة تكبح مبيعاتها من الأسلحة ، بينما تواصل حكومة المملكة المتحدة تأجيج الحرب". "يجب عليهم تغيير المسار الآن والعمل على دعم السلام الهادف".

قال مارتن بوتشر ، مستشار النزاع لمنظمة أوكسفام الدولية للمساعدة ، إن الساسة البريطانيين "مرة أخرى ... وضعوا الأرباح على حياة اليمنيين" ووصف مبيعات الأسلحة الموثقة يوم الثلاثاء بأنها "غير أخلاقية".

وقال بوتشر في بيان "يجب أن تتوقف صادرات الأسلحة إلى السعودية على الفور". "يعيش اليمن أكبر أزمة إنسانية في العالم ، حيث يعتمد ثلثا السكان على المساعدات الغذائية ومع ذلك يستفيد الناس من البؤس الناجم عن مبيعات الأسلحة هذه."

اتصلت الجزيرة بإدارة التجارة الدولية للتعليق على الانتقادات الموجهة للحكومة. رداً على ذلك ، قال متحدث باسم المملكة المتحدة إن المملكة المتحدة تدير "أحد أكثر أنظمة مراقبة الصادرات شمولاً في العالم".

Yemen. [Khaled Abdullah/Reuters]
صورة لأبنية في اليمن دمرت خلال الحرب

وقال المتحدث: "تأخذ الحكومة مسئولياتها التصديرية بجدية ودقة بتقييم جميع تراخيص التصدير وفقًا لمعايير الترخيص الصارمة". "لن نصدر أي تراخيص تصدير حيث يكون القيام بذلك غير متوافق مع هذه المعايير."

بدأ الصراع في اليمن في عام 2014 عندما سيطر الحوثيون على أجزاء كبيرة من البلاد ، بما في ذلك العاصمة صنعاء.

تصاعدت الحرب في مارس 2015 ، عندما تدخل التحالف بقيادة السعودية في محاولة لإعادة حكومة الرئيس هادي.

وقد ساعد التحالف من قبل العديد من القوى الغربية ، بما في ذلك المملكة المتحدة والولايات المتحدة. وفقًا لـ CAAT ، سمحت المملكة المتحدة بمبيعات أسلحة بقيمة 6.8 مليار جنيه إسترليني (9.3 مليار دولار) للسعودية منذ مارس 2015.

"بيع الأسلحة هو بريطانيا العظمى"
إعلان مترو الأنفاق ضد تجارة الأسلحة


منذ ذلك الحين ، اتُهم كلا الجانبين في النزاع اليمني بارتكاب جرائم حرب أثناء القتال الذي أودى بحياة أكثر من 110 آلاف شخص حتى الآن ، بما في ذلك ما يزيد عن 12500 مدني ، وفقًا لمشروع بيانات الأحداث ومكان النزاع المسلح.

وتوقفت محادثات السلام التي تهدف إلى حل الصراع منذ أواخر 2018 ، على الرغم من الجهود المتكررة من جانب مسؤولي الأمم المتحدة لإحياء المفاوضات وإنهاء ما وصفته بأكبر أزمة إنسانية في العالم.

وفقًا للأمم المتحدة ، يعتمد 80 بالمائة من سكان اليمن البالغ عددهم 30 مليون نسمة على المساعدات الإنسانية للبقاء على قيد الحياة.

السبت، 7 يوليو 2018

Review of "The Ba'thification of Iraq"

As a writer, the author of  The Ba'thification of Iraq (2015) can be commended for his command of Arabic political terminologies. He also has a penchant for Stalin and Nazi rants. He offers the Baath-Nazi-Commie analogies liberally in almost every chapter, which reveal his obvious ideological leanings as an advocate of the 2003 U.S. intervention. The U.S.-led post-invasion debathification process used the experience of de-nazification from the 1940s rather dogmatically, as documented by Dr. Aysegul Keskin Zeren in her 2017 work "From De-Nazification of Germany to De-Baathification of Iraq."


Published November 15th 2015 by University of Texas Press

If the author went beyond facile analogies of Stalin and Saddam, he could possibly see clearly that many strategies and slogans of the Baath Party was copied and / or adopted from the Iraqi Communist Party. The 20th century analytical theme--the party system functioned as a crucial apparatus for state formation--is lacking. The author is primarily focused on establishing the Baath Party as an exception rather than the rule.

As a historian, the author of this book stresses certain contexts out of proportion and overlooks other contexts, such as British imperialism. He portrays Ottoman political culture as faction-ridden and corrupt and uses this distortion to explain the lack of coalition building in Iraq and the demise of Abd al-Karim Qasim in the 1958 coup. Iraq seems to appear out of Oriental chaos, only to be saved. 


This author has used his privilege as an American (official) to access the Baath Party documents which have been housed in Hoover Institution Archives, courtesy of an agreement with the Iraqi Memory Foundation; the negative implications of this arrangement for the historiography of Iraq and ordinary citizens have been explained by historian Saad Eskander (http://libraryjuicepress.com/blog/?p=439).
Finally, this review could not have been possible if I did not have years of engaged readings on the functioning of the Chinese Communist Party. More cross-region comparisons should be employed for de-Orientalizing histories of the 20th century.

السبت، 14 نوفمبر 2015

Fighting Britain's War: India and World War II

Book Review of Yasmin Khan's Raj at War and Raghu Karnad's Farthest Field.  

The World War II has been taught based on the experiences of European countries on either side and the U.S.; the stories of China and India are usually absent from English bookshelves. In South Asia, nationalist agitations and Partition of 1947 dominated the stories of first half of twentieth century. Both Indian and European and people tend to forget the extent to which World War II influenced the Raj and the people under it. Millions of Indian soldiers were enlisted to fight for the allies in World War II and India also provided more than £2 billion worth of goods and services. Strategically, India was also situated between “both the Middle East and the China theatre” and supplied both troops and consumables. The impact in South Asia was also significant: The war increased social tensions and caused inflation. Indians also learned that the White Man was not inherently superior: Polish refugees at home, Japanese gaining upper hand over the British in the air, and Germans killed abroad by their fellow Indians all proved this point. The Raj could not protect its imperial subjects, and its credibility subsequently suffered. The Indian nationalist leaders also learned more about Britain’s political priorities, which were clearly not in favor of South Asian development. For leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, any wishes for the Raj to be a paternalistic leader of the Commonwealth vanished.
This year, two major books have replenished the scholarship on India and World War II. Historian Yasmin Khan’s book The Raj at War provides a lot of details and the statuses of people from all walks of life, from political leaders to businessmen, from new Tommy recruits, European nurses, and prisoners of war in India to Indian Lascars fighting for better wages. Her scope covers not only the war zone but also the factories and bedrooms. Journalist Raghu Karnad’s Farthest Field also serves to fill the gap of Indians in World War II, partly based on the experiences of his Parsi ancestors. Both books address the issues of political loyalty, the scorched earth policy, memories, and demise of the British Empire’s prestige. Both books acknowledged how different sections of society benefited from the War: businessmen in particular seized the chance for profits through supplying military needs, such as food and accommodation. Yet Karnad provides a more scathing critique of the War and colonialism.
One of the main reason for World War II’s forgotten status in India was its conflict with the national narrative. The main subject of Karnad’s book, Bobby, was not a story told or mentioned to Karnad’s generation. The Indian Army men’s “subaltern service to the British Empire became a quixotic memory, its political valency vague and its heroism diluted.” Like many unpredictable twist-of-fate moments in South Asian history, Bobby’s section, the 2nd Field of the Bengal sappers, was reorganized as a Mussalman unit and became part of Pakistan’s army. An even more cruel twist was that many demobilized soldiers slaughtered Indians of other faiths systematically during Partition. The grand dream of post-colonial countries usually glides over the fact that British Indian Army fought on the Dutch imperial side, against the Indonesian anti-colonial republicans led by Suharto.
Without the hindsight of Partition and Independence, the World War II was a trying time for Indians to determine political loyalties. Like in the case of World War I, the 1939 and 1942 Defence of India Act centralized British control in India for war efforts: state institutions had “powers of preventive detention, internment without trial, restriction of writing, speech, and of movement” over the King’s subjects in India, and in practice, mostly targeted against Indians. Punishments would be meted for “any contraventions which included that of death or transportation for life if the intent was to assist any State at war with His Majesty or that of waging war against His Majesty.” As a result, police and military’s power increased; the state’s civil and military functions blended. Many Indian activists were quashed unlawfully; official British statistics recorded 1,060 protesters killed. Nationalist agitations had increased to a certain level at that time. At the same time, the British and zamindari long-term neglect for agriculture increased the difficulty for the average Indian family to avoid working for the Raj. Even regions like Punjab which had increasing levels of wages suffered from famine. Congress Party leaders were largely uncertain how to take advantage of the situation. While Gandhi launched the Quit India movement and detested foreign soldiers on Indian soil, he did not call for an entire sabotage or even a peaceful hartal against the war effort; rather, he called for the Indians involved to act on their own consciences according to their own situation. Khan argues that it solidified anti-war sentiment despite its less dramatic character. Ironically, due to the War, the previously banned Indian communists now emerged from the underground as allies with the Raj against fascism.
The Raj at War highlighted how this era was truly contradictory and confusing, with South Asia pulled at both sides--Independence through fighting for the Indian National Army and thus aligning with the Japanese? Loyalty to the Raj? For example, writer K. A. Abbas wrote about his anti-fascist inclinations, but also disillusionment with the Raj. Yet India did not lack activists who directly opposed the Raj: The younger generations approached the issue more radically. Quit India activist Aruna Asaf Ali disregarded her husband Asaf Ali’s more moderate approach. She was regarded by the people as the modern day Rani of Jhansi and successfully evaded police search through a game of cat-and-mouse up till 1946. Moreover, there was a huge gap between military and non-military people’s political opinions, and even when they argued with one another, usually none were convinced. Similar to the starving Indian, the Nepali soldiers also lacked agency in the choice, since slavery was just recently abolished and their king volunteered to support the war effort. Karnad also cited how Parsis were traditionally loyal British subjects, even as his own family tried to deter men from entering direct service. Rather than outright support of swaraj, both books showed that the politics of Indians were in flux in the 1940s.

Aruna Asaf Ali

Aruna Asaf Ali
The Japanese were not the ideal allies for the Indian freedom fighters, since they also harbored imperial ambitions. Subhas Chandra Bose ceremonially celebrated the Andaman islands as territory under his government Azad Hind, even though in reality the Japanese authorities did not cede sovereignty. Under the influence of the Axis propaganda as well as material concerns, many Indian soldiers in South East Asia changed sides: Leaflets urged them to join INA and pursue self-determination against the Raj. Still, the INA was a dwarf in comparison to the giant British Indian Army.
Pilots of Azad Hind Sena, part of INA
Arguably, Indian soldiers for the first time fought for their own sovereignty from the Japanese, even though it was under a foreign master’s command. The Andaman and Nicobar islands were occupied in 1942 and many Indian cities were bombed by the Japanese Army. There were also intertwined destinies between Burma and India as the Raj’s subjects: the Japanese invasion caused many refugees of Indian origins flee from Burma. Many of the poor died on the way due to malaria or starvation.
Still, the War at large a British concern. The subjects who were usually loyal to British interests, such as rulers of princely states and North East tea plantation owners, donated many resources for the war effort. Others involved usually had no political stake, such as the Imphal jail convicts used for carrying loads or the Naga porters who facilitated refugees evacuation, or the tea plantation laborers who participated in building the India-China Ledo road and aerodromes. Even those Indians who did not support the War also could not outright deny the need for it, such as Nehru, who abhorred fascists but also wanted independence. In reality, this meant that the Raj got what it needed.
The war effort diverted most of the resources away from the Indian people. Viceroy Lord Linlithgow to a large extent disregarded the issue and spent no efforts lobbying on behalf of the situation. The viceroy who succeeded Linlithgow also tried to lobby the British parliament to send more grains for relief, but only achieved the promise for a quarter of what he asked. Khan equivocated and pointed to different reasons of the Bengal Famine, such as Bengal’s over reliance on rice, even while she cited evidence of the British being primarily culpable. Many famine victims saw the war as the cause of their plight. The Raj’s premature scorch earth policy destroyed and requisitioned a lot of boats of the fishermen. In comparison to Khan, historian Madhusree Mukerjee argues for a more direct causal link between the Bengal famine and the war effort. She wrote, that Raj’s readiness “to use the resources of India to wage war against Germany and Japan” was the primary reason for the famine. But given theories put forth by Amartya Sen (hoarders were the most responsible for famine), it is difficult to assess due to the varying statistics regarding how much grain was available after grain was given to war efforts.
Why did the British also forget the loyal subjects, especially the troops? This was mostly due to the idea of racial superiority as well as indifference to the native population during as well after the War. For example, when the Indian troops serving outside of India received better equipment than the natives defending the motherland. Winston Churchill, who was notorious for his racism and disdain, had said “by putting modern weapons in the hands of sepoys,” commanders were creating a Frankenstein. The former Commander in Chief Claude Auchinleck proposed the British government to establish a memorial for the men who serviced “Britain and the Empire” for the past two hundred years as well as in the “Old World” territories. But the proposal was delayed due to disagreement over the memorial site, then no funds were acquired and the plan for the memorial was discarded in 1949.
The major difference between the two books, aside from the sources, is that Karnad provides a more existential assessment of World War II: The White Man battled in sites that upheld Western civilization. The “Black men sent running and shooting in the jungle” such as Bobby’s army, would in comparison be seen as “ants disputing anthills.” The purpose of protecting democracy is elusive to most of the colonies; in “North and East Africa, in the Middle East and India’s North-West frontier,” both World Wars had the “climate of imperial control and contestation.” Karnad points out that behind supposed ideological differences between Axis and Allied powers, Germany and Japan “had mainly copied and outstripped Britain’s own example” of empire. He argued that the imperial war continues in different forms, such as 2008 drones over the village Datta Khel, where the Air Force also flew and battled. In contrast, Khan is much more measured in her assessments and hesitant to draw these solely regressive connections. She acknowledges the irony that Commonwealth soldiers helped in liberating Ethiopia from Italy’s colonialism, but the effects on Indian soldiers’ politics are hard to document. She also writes about black G.I.s and Indian soldiers sharing of notions of equality and visions of a new world order. She also addresses how some people viewed the Army as a modernizing force, and cites the increasing level of literacy among soldiers. Through both books’ new narratives, the nature of the War and the impacts on British colonies has become much clearer, but not necessarily clear enough. Further work needs to be done on the relationship between colonialism and the World Wars, with a focus on post-colonial countries and their positions during the Wars as well as the Wars' effects on subsequent nationalism and decolonization.


Edited from a paper for a JNU history course. Please contact me if readers need a footnoted version.

الأربعاء، 4 مارس 2015

Dalit Activism in Colonial South India: Pandit Iyothee Thass

I have finally written a paper on Pandit Iyothee Thass that is the precursor of Dalit activist B. R. Ambedkar. The legacy of these two men is also commemorated in my blog title--"Educate, Agitate, Organize." Footnotes have been simplified for the readability of this post. I will include a link formally cited version once I have converted the document into a pdf.

Political thinkers of the South Asian subcontinent who attempt to envision a better society in the nineteenth and twentieth century had to address, if not reconcile, the issue of caste. While most of the exploitation of the lower castes fell under the category of socioeconomic oppression, culture and values also played a role in their subjugation. Like darker skinned populations of post-slavery societies, Dalits and lower castes also faced the issue of social stigma and hegemonic values regarding their status. Some early scholars of the subcontinent, such as the European members of the Asiatic Society, have located utmost importance to these texts to their understanding caste, even though not all social practices originate from texts. These scholars have been accused of Orientalism and essentialism for using these ideas and addressing them to a diverse population and changing the way Indians think of themselves. Yet it is important to acknowledge that the ideas documented in texts wee also important for Indian intellectuals at that time to reconceptualize their society and religion. Rather than just listening to the European interpretation, Indian intellectuals also used the texts to their goals and politics.
In reaction to subjugation through history and narratives, many activists created their own foundation myths in attempts to rectify their status. One of the myths of Dalit and other lower caste activists have tried to address includes the Purusha Sukta’s corresponding each body part to each varna origin, with Brahmins coming from the man’s mouth and Shudras coming from the man’s feet. Notably, Dalits are not even included in the Sukta’s description and their oppression is also justified in many other religious and folkloric texts. These texts gained more prominence in the age of colonial censuses when officers used Puranic justifications for differentiating Shudras and Dalits from other castes. Many Dalits historicize their descent into untouchability because it indicates they are not “inherently menial, since their condition is historical and can therefore be overcome.”
While some of these myths have premodern origins, such as the Chuhras of Punjab, these myths received more attention once they were used to contest caste assignations after the advent of the ethnographic colonial state. Not all of these myths are emancipatory and some may have their own conservatism. Yet many non-Brahmin movements successfully utilized myths to challenge predominant myths, such as Jyotirao Phule’s eulogy of the Maratha king. Neo-Buddhist of Tamil Nadu argued that Arya-Brahmins entered the South, dominated after the decline of egalitarian Buddhism, created the four-fold varna system, and treated women in a different manner as well. Areas of new settlements of lower castes ordered by the colonial regime often became the hotbeds of anti-Brahminical and egalitarian movements and ideologies. For example, massive numbers from the notable Dalit groups in North India, the Chamars, converted to Islam in the 1920s. This paper will focus on the South Indian reinventions of myths regarding their land and society and the intellectual critiques of Dalit oppression and efforts of creating a Buddhist revival centered around Pandit Iyothee Thass.
In face of discussions regarding liberal values on equality in the second half of the eighteenth century, Brahmins felt obligated to defend the caste system. Some argued that caste was interlinked with fundamental tenets of Hinduism, while others argued that the caste system provided a good division of labor. To elite thinkers ranging from conservatives to reformers, the caste order could not and should not be instantly destroyed. They preferred to reform the order out of religious sentiments. They could not “step out” of the social order and regard it as a “historically evolved” one. Other reformers argued for varna as moral categories and that everyone can live the Brahminical way of life through cultivating a good character, devoting oneself to God and avoiding meats and liquor. These reformers included Mahatma Gandhi, who argued for including Dalits into an ideal varna system rather than throwing it away. Yet most of these reformers held back from critiquing the monopoly of certain spiritual acts by the Brahmins who have in turn exploited those who have been excluded from these qualities. Even some intellectuals who denounced caste-by-birth still wished to preserve the supposedly intellectually superior Brahmin caste and endogamous marriage practices to some extent as long as it was “humane.” As scholars Geeta and Rajadurai have argued, while some Brahmins were asserting their traditional rights while others responded positively to historical change, they were involved in imagining a society which would preserve the caste system and their own interests. It is understandable because from a religious perspective, Brahmins as well as other caste Hindus claimed a lot of ritual and spiritual privileges that were denied from Dalits. Brahmins were defined against the category of Dalits, which some regarded as having no "self" and would have been threatened if Dalits could also practice Brahmin rituals and attain spiritual advancement. Many caste Hindus as well as Dalits did not consider Dalits to be Hindus until politicians started scrambling tallies for more “Hindu” votes under representational democracy.
Aside from the notion Brahminism that affected most parts of South Asian society, South Indians also faced an additional challenge that worked against equality of all people: the theory of Aryan superiority. One of the theories that fused nationalism was that Indians enjoyed a high blood status from the northern Aryans. These Aryans were not the original inhabitants within the scope of the Indus river yet brought civilization to the region. While many historians such as Romila Thapar argue that the category of Aryan is most accurately a language group, many people to this day regard Aryans as a superior racial group often associated with Brahminical rituals. Dravidians, on the other hand, were portrayed as a more primitive race by Orientalists and later many northern nationalists. In the late nineteenth and twentieth century, intellectuals fought against these pro-Aryan narratives and stereotypes by arguing that adi dravidas were the "original Dravidians" before the arrival of the Aryan immigrant forces (mlechcha) and also established a rich civilization. These activists highlighted the advanced architecture, metal work and sculptures before Aryans. Symbols like the lingam and temple inscriptions preexisted Aryans as well but were incorporated into Brahminical orthodoxy. M. Masilamani, a neo-Buddhist intellectual, noted the subordination of the upper-caste woman to stringent norms consolidated the Brahmin males’ power and argued that arranging marriages were introduced by Aryans. Textual and scriptural evidence indeed support that caste norms were not solidified until the eleventh century in Tamil Nadu. Activists urged to reject Brahminical elements in Tamil culture. Another issue of divergence between the North and South regards language. Many non-Brahmins who joined the non-Brahmin movement spoke two main Dravidian language groups: Tamil and Telegu. Before the agitations against Hindi in the 1930s, South Indian Justice Party members already noted that Sanskrit was a badge of privilege and the disregard for local “vernaculars” such as Tamil and Telugu, allowed for elitist attitudes to flourish. For many activists, being Dravidian meant reviving an autonomous history before the Aryans and dominance of caste ideology. 

One of most original yet comparatively unknown South Indian intellectuals who championed these views was Pandit Iyothee Thass. Unlike the non-Brahmins, Paraiahs of the farm servant caste, like Thass, were considered lowest on the purity ranks. Their interests were not represented as much as non-Brahmins in later Dravidian movements of the twentieth century. Thass consciously chose the term "Poorva Tamizha," the original Tamil, to distinguish and highlight his community’s status even among the “original Dravidians.” Still, Thass imagined a future where all castes could show solidarity with Dalits and renounce caste order. Thus Thass should command even more attention for not only the similarities with non-Bramin and pro-Dravidian movements but also for his debates against untouchable stigma. Even among the Dravidians, they were not always included in the fraternity. His publication The Tamizhan produced rich content and galvanized Tamil circles and beyond, for reasons which this paper will explore.



Pariahs from Madras," from 'Naturgeschichte und Abbildungen
Like most places in colonial India, socioeconomic changes in Tamil Nadu helped the Dalits and lower castes. But the policy effects were not felt equally and many they still faced oppression and envy from privileged upper castes. The British efforts to commercialize property and land grants in the early twentieth century facilitated lower castes to acquire land. A British district collector in the Cumbum Valley insisted that granting land was the only solution to elevate the position of Kallars from “criminality.” Yet this intention does not corroborate with successful land reform results, since the British also relied on old institutions like mirasdars for agricultural revenue extraction. Even among places that achieved marginal land redistribution, discrimination from upper castes was still rampant and violent. Newly propertied castes were still vulnerable to upper caste neighbors’ attacks. For example, upper castes destroyed huts and crops raised in adi dravidas kitchen gardens, denied Paraiahs to occupational rights in subtenancies, and cut off water flow to Paraiah-owned fields. The Tamizhan’s initial audience were Thass’ own Pariah community in Madras, nowadays known as Chennai, and North and South Arcot who have have improved their economic conditions through recruitment in the army, migration to mining and urban centers, and employment with British in menial jobs.
Many publications and journals sprung up in South India at the time for these populations that ridiculed Brahminical exclusivity, such as Periyar E. V. Ramasamy’s English journal Revolt. The diaspora of Tamils added to a large audience of Thass’ Tamil-language publication The Tamizhan, such as converts to Catholicism abroad. It was circulated wherever lower caste Tamil people migrated for jobs, including South Africa, Burma, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Mauritius, Singapore, Malaysia, and Tanzania. The Tamizhan’s readership abroad demonstrates the salience of the issues tackled by Iyothee Thass and other contributors. The origins of Tamil migrant workers presence abroad was inseparable from oppressive caste regulations. The British colonizers promoted migration of labor for their own ends, such as ensuring a supply of labor to increase revenue from its colonies. Tamil oversea migration increased in nineteenth century; by the 1820s there were approximately a million and a half Tamils working overseas. Lower castes and Dalits literally escaped from the oppressive caste system and ideology through migration. Large scale migration consisted mostly of lower castes laborers, “from areas of settled agriculture to urban and mining centers, arid areas and to overseas colonies.” Dalits often emigrated to search for work that came with dignity. Workers in plantations received the same wages, lived in labor lines rather than segregated areas according to hierarchy. Also, there were no special ritual concessions for higher castes and all experienced same level of hardship. Main motivations behind these lower caste migrations included anonymity within a larger society and a chance of self-determination. In this context, Thass criticized the nationalists who opposed forced out-migration. Since caste norms prevented a Paraiah from owning land, protesting the migration of these workers who were formerly working in slave conditions seemed to Thass an instance of “misplaced charity.” The contributors used vernacular languages to express opposition to Brahminism, casteism, and Sanskritic culture. One of the Buddhist contributors, Sri Siddhartha Puthagasalai, published in the Tamizhan many tracts on the condition of Paraiahs, their lost Buddhist faith and ancient Tamil texts that appear Hindu but once had Buddhist origins. Along with South Indian neo-Buddhists of his time, Thass argued for the idea of a respected Tamizhan (or Tamil) regardless of his caste for the present and envisioned an adi dravidas community that had an egalitarian Buddhist past. Buddhists were the real Brahmins yet they were subjugated by the fake (vesha) Brahmin Aryans and stigmatized for non-conformity. Similar to Puthagasalai’s argument, Thass thought that the fake Brahmins Hinduized Buddhist scriptures. Thass demonstrated in through studies of Tamil sacred and literary texts how the victory of Brahminism in South Asia occurred in step with the demise of Buddhism and perhaps caused the latter. For example, In The Significance of Meditating on Abigai Amman in the Month of Aadi, Thass argued that the Aadi celebration commemorated the Ambigai of Puna Nadu, formerly a Princess, for her healing powers as a Buddhist female monk (bhikkuni). Yet later her legacy was co-opted into Hindu tradition as an angry goddess. Thass also argued that the Thirikural, highly regarded as the document of Tamil propriety, originated from the three Buddhist pitakas. The Brahmins falsely attributed the authorship to a man with a Brahmin father and a Paraiah mother, Thass argued, or else they would not be able to explain the author’s “extraordinary” intelligence. Later scholars also argued that Thirikural shows strong similarities with Jainist and Buddhist moral teachings. The Tamizhan also included many writings by Thass and neo-Buddhists on the life of the Buddha, his teachings, and Buddhist dharma. Thass converted to Buddhism and also inspired many other Paraiahs’ conversions. The Pariahs in Madras were only one of many instances of Dalit group conversions in India. Later B. R. Ambedkar also argued a similar thesis to Thass, that the Brahmins imposed untouchability on Dalits (“Broken Men” in Marathi) because they refused to convert from Buddhism. Thass considered Christianity and Islam helpful for uplifting Dalits, but Buddhism was more capable of Brahminical oppression than the other traditions because it has combated Brahminism for a long duration, before the arrival of Christianity or Islam, and thus had more philosophical resources to confront Brahminism. Even after Thass’ death, The Tamizhan continued to uphold his legacy: it was among the South Indian publications that publicized the large non-Brahmin movement’s aims and message in 1916. The Non-Brahmin Manifesto listed the absence of non-Brahmins many government institutions and also posed demands, “Progressive Political Development wanted and not unauthorised Constitution-Making; No Caste Rule and Self Government on Equal Distribution of Power.” There were broader similarities among these lower caste movements, such as wide horizontal mobilization, spread education for emancipation, demand to share political power with upper castes, and diversify occupations, and they all posed a challenge to the nationalists.
Many nationalists and anti-imperialists had opinions regarding caste and most were very outspoken, both before and after Thass' times. Annie Besant, once the leader of the Theosophical Society and a fervent Irish participant in the Indian nationalist Home Rule movement, was one of the Brahminical admirers who had paternalistic attitudes towards Dalits. For example, she argued that Dalits should work their karma to break free from their abject position of untouchability. Annie Besant also edited New India, which constantly published columns against the Non-Brahmin Manifesto, including her own. The Justice attacked New India and taunted Besant as an “Irish Brahmani.” After being challenged, she eventually refused to publish any articles related to this subject.
While these spates happened after Thass’ death, it highlights the tensions between caste self-respect movements and nationalism that continued to haunt India even after its independence. One of Thass’ most controversial stances was his skepticism of the national movement. First of all, he saw Brahminical authority dominating nationalist movements such as swaraj. He criticized the nationalists who blamed British imperialists for the starvation without taking into account their own complicity. For example, many of these Brahmin nationalists in Madras owned land that owned land tilled by workers that lacked adequate wages. Some also planted cash crops over food crops that led to many famines in Madras. Instead of focusing on the British, Thass criticized the greed of the landlord and the merchant and the Brahmin’s indifference who were complicit since they would not give any portion of his earnings towards famine relief.
Both Iyothee Thass and members of the non-Brahmin Justice Party questioned the legitimacy of the Indian National Congress to represent all Indians, stemming from two questions: caste as an identity issue and as a labor issue. The Madras Congress was predominantly Brahmin twenty years after its existence. Only swadeshi protests sent out their message more effectively across society to non-Brahmin. Thass held that Brahmin usually protected his own caste interests and historically expended unnecessary energy on tasks defining "rules of touchability, seeability and approachability" and these rules still influenced everyday actions. Thass also listed cases of discrimination exhibited by the largely Brahmin-owned press who constructed public opinion. Swaraj and Swadeshi seemed insincere to Thass where the social norms were governed by untouchability. Thass regarded social reform of caste should be prior to political reform and that swaraj should be not just Indians’ self-government, but also a “state of social and economic well-being.” He questioned whether or not the slums occupied by Paraiahs, called paracheris, could also be included under the grand scheme nationalists had for their ideal “Motherland.” In this context of criticizing nationalism for upholding the abstract notion of sovereign land, Thass even defended Lord Curzon's decision to partition Bengal as an administrative move and that the nationalists despised Curzon because he sought to improve the conditions of all castes. His skepticism was not unfounded, for non-Brahmin leaders of swadeshi like M. K. Gandhi did not break rules of inter-caste dining. In 1946, even as Gandhi showed solidarity, he tactically refused to take food from a Dalit group Balmikis when he attempted to show solidarity. Many anti-imperialists considered British benevolence for Dalits as well as Muslims to be part of a “divide and rule” agenda. Nationalist leaders and supporters of Home Rule, such as Annie Besant, did not put the status of Dalits at the forefront of its initiatives partly due to Brahmin dominance in the Congress Party.
Second of all, for Thass, swadeshi nationalism could not link its politics with transforming labor systems that exploited Dalits. Yet he did not highlight the the British rule’s tolerance of the existing labor arrangements. The adi dravida intellectuals at the time generally did not associate colonial rule presence with local matters. For example, Thass had argued that the British presence had use for it led to roads and railways, which facilitated the delivery of grain to famine-struck places. Many non-Brahmins feared that once the British left, there would be no arbiter left for caste relations and Brahmins might return to the old way of governance. The raja of Panagal once said that Home Rule might "push back the non-Brahmin communities to their original state of dependence and enslavement and re-install in the place of our British rulers the very priestly class who were responsible for unenviable state in which the non-Brahmin communities were stagnating before the advent of the British rule." Many South Indian non-Brahmin intellectuals and social figures considered the British colonial presence effectively polices Brahminical dominance.
But the British could not directly feel the negative impacts themselves and they did not share the similar urgency for abolishing caste rules as the victimized Dalits. As the ruling authority, a British official did not have to comply with rules of ritual purity--he could eat beef and still socialize with all classes without being stigmatized from locals. Furthermore, the British rulers were self-interested even as they promoted varying degrees of equality on the surface. Authors have argued that the British also circumscribed the politically active Brahmin through accommodating rival interests such as lower castes through social reform policies. This move also added to their perception among non-Brahmins as benevolent rulers.


The Kalaram Temple of Nashik city in Maharashtra, India
The non-Brahmin intellectuals and Thass’ view of the British intentions was overly optimistic, especially in regards to the issue of caste. Even though the British rulers knew that there was slavery practiced in Madras ryotwaris, they did not abolish it because they retained revenue from these farms. the government should not meddle with the ideal of private property. A ruling in 1819 expressed that the raiyats possess their slaves as private property. Consistent with the British attitudes towards caste, the court wrote that "it must be dangerous to disturb the long established relations subsisting between these two orders." After an official and some missionaries raised the Paraiah question in London, the Tamil Nadu Revenue Board still refused to acknowledge the existence of slavery and even allowed for bondage to continue in an intransigent statement. Yet the notion that all members of society can access public property and the expansion of what should be defined as “public” rather than community-based had to be continuously fought through several Dalit leaders’ agitations in the twentieth century, such as B. R. Ambedkar’s Kalaram Temple movement in 1930. The Congress Party also supported instances, such as the 1924 Vaikom Satyagraha in Travancore, Kerala, spearheaded by the lower-caste Ezhavas. The British officials of the Madras region were obviously not in the front lines for redefining or defending the ideal of public property as much as private. While criticizing caste rules and norms, the British also worked to solidify them when it worked in their political and economic interest.
In conclusion, Iyothee Thass produced a lot of significant works and opinions that carved an intellectual space for Dalits in Madras to reflect on their religious identity and social existence. His publication joined many others that aided the Dravidian movement call to eradicate Brahminical and Aryan dominationwhile also saving a distance from pan-South Indian Dravidianism for Dalit-focused activities through theorizing and practicing Buddhism. while also remaining a distance for Dalit-focused activities through theorizing and practicing Buddhism. His ideas on pre-Hindu culture, such as the origins of Thirikural, were surprisingly original and many of his theories of "Hinduization" were corroborated with later scholarship as well. Thass resisted the predominant tendency to glorify the anti-imperialist movement, critically examined Home Rule, and engaged with leaders of the other movements. While he overestimated how much the British colonial rulers were committed to the uplifting of Depressed Classes such as Dalits, along with members of the Justice Party he was an extremely important voice of dissent in turbulent times.

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