themes in the art and drag performances of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto / Faluda Islam

 Artist and memory activist Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Jr. created a drag persona to address issues of Islamophobia and homophobia in the world. Drag is ​​a performance

of gender that parody gender norms could shatter the illusion that there are only two genders – man and woman – and lead to a proliferation of genders; or rather to a recognition of, and ability to speak about, the already existing great diversity of genders, sexualities, bodies and pleasures (Evans and Williams, 2013).

 

In an interview, Zulfikar, also known as Zulfi, discussed his drag persona “Faluda Islam”: “She is a zombie, she was resurrected through Wi-Fi technology and the way she died was in the future queer revolution,” Zulfi explained. “She’s sort of an oracle… she’s able to give an insight into [the] past, present and future” (Burke, 2018). Faluda disrupts the binaries of organic-machine, male-female, even life-death with each performance as a queer Muslim icon.

Zulfikar Jr. is named after his late ancestor Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was a prominent politician and leader of the People’s Party in Pakistan. In a way that subverts heteronormative expectations of Zulfi, he bravely entered the international art world with pieces that address his cultural background and extended the limits of the name in creating a drag persona. Zulfi recalled his father, Murtaza Bhutto’s assasination, when discussing this persona, and the themes he wishes to explore: “I talk about injustice, who gets the right to live or die, who is the decider of that,” says Zulfi. “War comes up, aspects of martyrdom come up, Islamophobia comes up.” (Burke, 2018) In my understanding, he is addressing the existential weight of being born a male in a Shi’a family and the expectations of martyrdom of such a gender identity. This responsibility was heightened during the Iran-Iraq war that started in the late 1980s when mostly Shi’a men as well as children in Iran fought their enemy combatants in Iraq.

Zulfi explained his ideas in an interview with Reconstructed Mag in May, 2020:

Why are we forced to make our children and families martyrs? What are the forces against us that make us go into these spaces that end in death? The drag character Faluda Islam questions this. The character is my attempt to look at revolution through a high femme lens (Bhutto, 2020).

 

Digitisation allows for “humans to mobilise memories that cut across the individual and the collective, the institutional and the corporate, the local and the global in ways that disrupt conventional binaries of the public and private, of the body and other” (Reading, 2016). Faluda exists digitally and in performances, disrupting the idea that a “man” protects “his women.” Faluda’s martyrdom and reincarnation as a Zombie may have been for all queer individuals, rather than for prolonging a heterosexual mode of reprdocution. Faluda as a Zombie, in Zulfi’s intention, also remembers the anti-imperialist slave rebellions in Haiti, where Zombies were an esoteric instrument to defeat the white settler-enslavers.

As a multidisciplinary artist, Zulfi’s other conventional artworks likewise explore the Shi’a Muslim’s conundrum of remembering assaults in Islamic history through lamenting the past, while other events celebrate masculinity as strength. As an artist, Zulfi highlights the inherent queerness of such an identity, despite the state’s priority to limit the identity as straight and one-dimensional. In critiquing the national imagery of a strong man, Zulfi said in an interview, in the context of his textile artwork series “Mussalman Muscleman”: “What for me is masculinity? It's softness” (Bhutto, 2017). In his works of a fictitious queer rebellion, he uses imageries of “brown and black body by creating glamorous queered future guerrilla fighters who do not fit neatly into categories of gender, race, faith, threat or desirable subject.” The works sought “to challenge the shifting borders between terrorist and freedom fighter as seen and named by the Anglo-Saxon world” (Bhutto, 2019). Memory, gender and technology are the themes explored by Bhutto’s works and the tools which allow him to express his ideas to a largely heteronormative public.

 

 

 

One of his exhibits

In “Future Faithful: Islamic Experiments in Space Exploration and Posthumanism” in 2021 at the Bass & Reiner gallery in San Francisco, U.S., Zulfi's artworks incorporate imagery of the calf as a reference to the second chapter in the Holy Quran, “The Heifer.”

 

 

“mustaq-bel 2,” 2019. By Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Zulfi’s artworks reference traditional architecture and mythology. The calf has appeared prior as a sacrificial motif in Abrahamic traditions. This metaphoric practice has been substituted by the sheep or lamb in some ritual instances out of respect for others who found the sacrifice of the cow offensive, such as in India and Pakistan. In Sher Shah, Pakistan, a Shi’a saint’s shrine has been used by pious locals both as a shrine for fulfilling human prayers and a cow sanctuary, which demonstrates the power of cultural syncretism in the subcontinent (Khalid, 2016).  The popular press and general population in South Asia interpret spaces like shrines (dargah) as examples of tolerance, since both Hindus and Muslims participate in worship and place requests to the saint of the shrine. They burn incense (loban) and consequently experience therapeutic convulsions against evil spirits that possess them (haziri) (Bellamy, 2011). Sometimes they are places of refuge and sources of cures to illnesses and evil spirits, while other times they are Gedächtnisraum (memory spaces). The usages of these spaces have been altered by modernity, as witnessed by the declining numbers of cows at the Sher Shah shrine.

The textile works by Zulfi were “created to honor real and imagined queer guerrilla fighters from Shiite Muslim traditions of martyr and saint veneration” (Bass & Reiner, 2021). More than just remembering a scar from a millennium-old feud, Muharram rituals as well as Zulfi’s artworks both symbolize a rejection of illegitimate state authority, which many Shi‘as also regard as a key feature of their faith (Freitag, 1989). In Zulfi’s praxis, he is directly addressing wealth inequality of the present.

The evolution of Muharram rituals in South Asia from a religious ritual to an “urban ritual” can be observed from the level of urban negotiation among the multi religious participants (Nejad, 2015). The processions are not limited to one sect or codified in one practice and often have multiple meanings. Different communities establish their own tazia, (also spelled as ta‘ziyah and ta‘ziyeh) which symbolically represents martyrs’ tombs, and carry it to the area that symbolizes the battlefield of Karbala. Zulfi’s work of “Mercy 258 رحیم ۲۵۸” paid tribute to such a practice; his symbolic Karbala was the art gallery of his exhibition.

 

 

 

Mercy 258 رحیم ۲۵۸. by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Screen print on muslin, chiffon and raw silk, inkjet print on silk, various trimming and plastic sequins. 2020, 148 x 28 in

 

In conclusion, this essay has explored the drag persona Faluda Islam, along with other works by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to demonstrate the potency of memory in his artwork. As an activist addressing Islamophobia and homophobia, Zulfi uses both embodied performances, audiovisual recordings, as well as hand sewn textiles in his ongoing works. Memory both informs the work and energizes the viewers who share part of the knowledge systems and geographies as Zulfikar’s upbringing. The drag zombie Faluda Islam interrogated on the idea that gender is a learned memory that is hard to alter or evolve; rather, the gender practices may or may not survive a future apocalypse. Memory is both the medium and the message.

 

 

 

Works Cited

Bass & Reiner. 2021. Future Faithful — Bass & Reiner. [online] Available at: <https://bassandreiner.com/zulfi> [Accessed 21 December 2021].

 

Bellamy, C., 2011. The Powerful Ephemeral: Everyday Healing in an Ambiguously Islamic Place. University of California Press. 33.

 

Bhutto, Z., 2020. Live Interview with Reconstructed Mag.

 

—----------., 2019. [online] Praxis Center. Available at: <https://kzoo.edu/praxis/artists/zulfikar-ali-bhutto/> [Accessed 21 December 2021].

 

—----------. 2017. [online] The Tumeric Project. Available at: <youtube.com/watch?v=bc8VtrHA8QE> [Accessed 21 December 2021].

 

Burke, S., 2018. Meet Faluda Islam, the Muslim Drag Queen From the Future. [online] Vice.com. Available at: <https://www.vice.com/en/article/7xjbgb/muslim-drag-queen-faluda-islam-zulfikar-ali-bhutto-queerly-beloved> [Accessed 21 December 2021].

 

Evans, M. and Williams, C., 2013. Gender. Routledge.

 

Freitag, S., 1989. Collective Action and Community. Berkeley: University of California Press. 251.

 

Khalid, H., 2016. The changing fate of a Muslim shrine where cows are sacred. [online] The Caravan. Available at: <https://caravanmagazine.in/lede/thinning-the-herd> [Accessed 21 December 2021].

 

Nejad, R. M. 2015. "Urban Margins, A Refuge For Muharram Processions In Bombay: Towards An Idea Of Cultural Resilience". Südasien-Chronik 5. 341.

 

Reading, A. 2016. Gender and Memory in the Globital Age. Palgrave MacMillan.

In Conversation with a Pakistani Student on Politics

This is a partial transcription of my interview with Zaheer who was quite active in his years at his University based in Karachi with activities in support of PPP (Pakistan People's Party).  We conducted the interview in Goettingen, at his dorm during last year's Ramadan. The dorm is known as the student village (Studentendorf) and is usually free of political discussions about Pakistan. Zahir frowns on these discussions, which in his experience often led to discordance among friends. He was also fasting for Ramadan at the time of the interview. Therefore I am very grateful that this interview took place. The interview was initially conducted for my thesis on Pakistani nationalism; it was a difficult topic and I later changed it. The first half of the interview transcription with Zaheer was lost due to a computer problem. But the following transcription is also quite illuminating on current Pakistani politics and civil society.

Founder of PTI former cricketer Imran Khan

Has your family voted?

Zaheer: Yeah, they do. In Pakistan, it doesn't matter if it's a non-party or party basis election. In Pakistan, especially villages (90-95%) voting is done on [an] individual basis, not on party [basis]. If there are 10 candidates in one constituency, we will vote for 1 person. It doesn't matter if he stays in PPP, Noon league or any other Party. This is one reason for the bad democratic system in Pakistan, it's not a real democracy. It's the case in most developing countries. In developing countries, most parties do not continue for the next term. In developing countries, people won't satisfy. In developing countries, people are educated and they know, if they want to see results, they have to give a person 8-10 years. Because 4 years is nothing, especially for major projects. But in developing countries, they don't [give that much time]. So one time one party wins, next time it's a clean sweep. Next time, again that party comes. So in Pakistan, there was a two party system. Now the paradigm has changed, there is a new party that has gained a lot of attention and votes. In voting, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) is the most popular party. But for the last 50-60 years it has been a swinging from one side to another side thing.



How does your family vote?

Zaheer: Mostly personal or on caste, religious lines. In my family, the females mostly are not interested in politics, they are just told 'ok we are going to vote for them,' and they say "ok. fine." One of the males say vote for them, and that's it. But now, my younger sister is educated and has a pretty good knowledge of politics and she's into it. So this time she was there, she has started discussions with the family members and others. "Ok we have to think." It's getting changed.


In your family who usually decides (which way the vote goes)?

Zaheer: The educated ones decide. Most of the educated people [of my family] are out of the village. Half of them are in Karachi, I am here [in Germany], some guys are in Islamabad.


They don't go home to vote?

Zaheer: No. Some family members vote in Karachi. But in village, my uncle, he participates and he decides "we are voting them." It's not forcefully, but they ask, "we will vote for them." In our societies people have respect for them, so they don't oppose.


Which candidate is supported from your village?

Zaheer: In the national level, mostly people vote for the People's Party. Those who think on party lines they vote for People's Party. There is also a member of national assembly and member of the provincial assembly. So these guys swing and don't have a fixed party. They participated in 3 different parties.

Our village used to vote for these two people. But now the younger generation stood and said "we are not going to vote for this person. We are voting for him, his father and grandfather, so we didn't get anything. He just came in election time and doesn't show up again" and so on.

You can say the elders are on one side and the younger (generation) are on another side. The young generation won in the last 3 elections. They stood against the panchayat system and the main decision makers of the village, they got the vote and they won. So this is the indication that the elders have to think "what I have suggested in the last elections," about their policies and loyalties.



Which party does your Karachi part of your family support?

Zaheer: The People's party. Why? I am very interested in politics so I have views on all of the parties. For example, the MQM (Muttahida Quami Movement). I vote 10/10 for party organization. They have good control on party and good party infrastructure. They give chance to the middle class or lower class to lead. But there is a problem. There is a terror wing, which is a big question mark. The MQM is a very liberal pary, open-minded, so you can say it's a left party. I like them but they support terror. There are some people who are there (in the terror wing).
The next party I like is the Awami National Party in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is pretty much liberal. But it's very limited, it's only in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, their leaders are more pro-Afghanistan than Pakistan, but still they are a liberal party. So I think it's a good party.

"The Awami National Party's holds much support in Pashtun-dominated areas of Karachi. They have decked this bridge with their traditional red, and slogans supporting the party's Karachi leadership." - Asad Hashim, Al Jazeera

I like and support People's Party, because it's the Party of most educated people, and they are more liberal, they have real democratic attitudes, so such kind of parties we need in Pakistan. Other parties, for example PTI, PTI is good, their slogan ["Justice, Humanity and Self Esteem"] is good. They are demanding good things, but their way of proceeding is not very good. Unfortunately, I don't agree with their ways most of the time.

What do you mean? In terms of the execution?

Zaheer: Not the execution. For example, the [PTI's] wish is: "within a day something happens and the things would change." Big change doesn't happen. Big change only happens when there is a war. You have to give a lot to get big change. For example, last year or the year before, there was demonstration against election rigging and so on. The PTI boycotted the elections. There was a good chance to get a big change. In Pakistan, elections are always rigged. So they were demanding to investigate and demanding to change the constitution and electoral votings. They were demanding everything that was good for the election system. But suddenly, Imran Khan said, "ok, we are not accepting anything unless Nawaz Sharif (our Prime Minister) resigns." Which was not the point. (The PTI) demanded 6 demands. There was a time when the government was almost ready to accept 6 out of 6 demands. In politics it doesn't happen. In politics, you cannot get 100%. If you get 50%, it's your win. And then, all logical and right demands (the government) was going to accept, then Imran Khan said "we need the resignation of Nawaz Sharif." Once he saw that "I have a big crowd, I have a big force, let's demolish it," that was the point when all other parties stood with Nawaz Sharif, because (Imran Khan) was almost against the parliament system. They stood with him, and by the time the whole pressure was gone.

So the government that was ready to agree the 6 demands, at the end (Imram Khan) got nothing. There isn't any change in the electoral system, and he hasn't got any single thing. It was the individual decision. One person has wasted 3 months of the nation. He has wasted energies of the people. I would say 200,000 or even more people were sitting in Islamabad, that was wasted. So I wouldn't go behind that leader. The leader who cannot judge or who cannot bargain the right thing is not right. This is one reason. Another reason is that he is pro-Taliban. He was saying "we have to talk we have to talk," but it seems like he did a little chorus. He repeatedly said "we have to talk we have to talk." Ok, we have to talk. But it's not like we are begging to talk. We are a sovereign country, we have to take action so we have to bring them on the table on our terms. So Imran Khan is very famous among the young generation, he is our national hero, and I respect him as my hero. But he is my hero in cricket, not in politics. But most of the Pakistanis consider him as a hero in politics as well. Yes, his demands are right. But he has changed the game , he was pro-Taliban and everyone was giving justification "yes he's saying right" and that was a big question mark for me.

But otherwise yes I support most of the things (represented by) PTI.


The final party Muslim League, they don't have a democratic attitude, they are ruling like a dictator, so i don't like them. Every time they come in power, they created mess. Every time they messed up with the army, and then the army took over, and then the army messed up the country, and then every time they have given the country to the People's Party to regain the strength and reestablish the institutions. We had coup 3 times. After all 3 times, the People's Party came into power.


So you think the army intrudes in civil society. Do you think the civil society is stronger now?

Raheel Sharif, center right, with prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, center left.
Caren Firouz/Reuters

Zaheer: Yes, I think so. Civil society has become and is becoming stronger. I wish we are not going to have another coup or another army dictatorship. I don't think it's going to happen. For example, there were serious conflicts between the government and the general head quarters (GHQ) of he Army. But the army didn't dare to coup. One can say that was a time when the Army could have took over but didn't. Media has played a large role there. There is more awareness, people are more vibrant now. They are taking part in politics. Our army chief, general Raheel Sharif, he belongs to a family who has served since long. some of his family members has got the highest Nishan [i-Pakistan] award in the army (*Wikipedia: The Nishan [i-Pakistan] "is the highest of civil awards and decorations given by the Government of Pakistan for the highest degree of service to the country and nation of Pakistan"). He kept his family tradition and stayed away from politics. he could have taken over in recent years if he wanted to. People were ready, political parties were ready, everyone was ready.


If there was a coup, there wouldn't have been a lot of resistance. You can see on the media. The government was almost gone. There wasn't a lot of control on institutions. right now, there are Panama leaks, the PM (Prime Minister) was listed.

There were some people calling for a "military coup and save the country" and so on. In developing countries, the memory is short. They don't think about the past but focus on the present.
I don't think it's going to happen again. In the past, the army was on one side, the otehr side political parties wanted to take over and fabricating reasons to take over. Nawaz Sharif has dismissed our army chief when he was on an official trip in Sri Lanka. Sharif dismissed him. That was something very vague. You are the supreme leader, you can do it, but you have to do it in a proper way. They created a mess and was the reason for the army to take over.

Recently, when Imran Khan was in the demonstration, there was a peak time and everything was settle for a [military] takeover. But the parties such as PPP stood with the government. They said, we also want change, within parliament or within our system. Not extra.

In the past, there was a fight between PPP and Muslim League Noon. They were always blaming each other until the army takeover. Now there were tensions between parties, but they didn't get to the point so the army takeover. There is maturity in political parties. The reason was provided by political parties (for an army takover)

They stood by Nawaz Sharif and against Imran Khan and all those who wanted to demolish and wrap up the system. They stood against that thing. We don't support to wrap up the system, we don't support to demolish our parliament. if you want to change something, let's talk get into the Parliament, let's talk and decide here we will support you.

-------------------------------------------------------------

Some unanswered question from my side: Even though Imran Khan's movement was a mass movement, it could also harbor antidemocratic tendencies and might pose a threat to civil society.

Fighting Britain's War: India and World War II

Book Review of Yasmin Khan's Raj at War and Raghu Karnad's Farthest Field.  

The World War II has been taught based on the experiences of European countries on either side and the U.S.; the stories of China and India are usually absent from English bookshelves. In South Asia, nationalist agitations and Partition of 1947 dominated the stories of first half of twentieth century. Both Indian and European and people tend to forget the extent to which World War II influenced the Raj and the people under it. Millions of Indian soldiers were enlisted to fight for the allies in World War II and India also provided more than £2 billion worth of goods and services. Strategically, India was also situated between “both the Middle East and the China theatre” and supplied both troops and consumables. The impact in South Asia was also significant: The war increased social tensions and caused inflation. Indians also learned that the White Man was not inherently superior: Polish refugees at home, Japanese gaining upper hand over the British in the air, and Germans killed abroad by their fellow Indians all proved this point. The Raj could not protect its imperial subjects, and its credibility subsequently suffered. The Indian nationalist leaders also learned more about Britain’s political priorities, which were clearly not in favor of South Asian development. For leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, any wishes for the Raj to be a paternalistic leader of the Commonwealth vanished.

This year, two major books have replenished the scholarship on India and World War II. Historian Yasmin Khan’s book The Raj at War provides a lot of details and the statuses of people from all walks of life, from political leaders to businessmen, from new Tommy recruits, European nurses, and prisoners of war in India to Indian Lascars fighting for better wages. Her scope covers not only the war zone but also the factories and bedrooms. Journalist Raghu Karnad’s Farthest Field also serves to fill the gap of Indians in World War II, partly based on the experiences of his Parsi ancestors. Both books address the issues of political loyalty, the scorched earth policy, memories, and demise of the British Empire’s prestige. Both books acknowledged how different sections of society benefited from the War: businessmen in particular seized the chance for profits through supplying military needs, such as food and accommodation. Yet Karnad provides a more scathing critique of the War and colonialism.

One of the main reason for World War II’s forgotten status in India was its conflict with the national narrative. The main subject of Karnad’s book, Bobby, was not a story told or mentioned to Karnad’s generation. The Indian Army men’s “subaltern service to the British Empire became a quixotic memory, its political valency vague and its heroism diluted.” Like many unpredictable twist-of-fate moments in South Asian history, Bobby’s section, the 2nd Field of the Bengal sappers, was reorganized as a Mussalman unit and became part of Pakistan’s army. An even more cruel twist was that many demobilized soldiers slaughtered Indians of other faiths systematically during Partition. The grand dream of post-colonial countries usually glides over the fact that British Indian Army fought on the Dutch imperial side, against the Indonesian anti-colonial republicans led by Suharto.

Without the hindsight of Partition and Independence, the World War II was a trying time for Indians to determine political loyalties. Like in the case of World War I, the 1939 and 1942 Defence of India Act centralized British control in India for war efforts: state institutions had “powers of preventive detention, internment without trial, restriction of writing, speech, and of movement” over the King’s subjects in India, and in practice, mostly targeted against Indians. Punishments would be meted for “any contraventions which included that of death or transportation for life if the intent was to assist any State at war with His Majesty or that of waging war against His Majesty.” As a result, police and military’s power increased; the state’s civil and military functions blended. Many Indian activists were quashed unlawfully; official British statistics recorded 1,060 protesters killed. Nationalist agitations had increased to a certain level at that time. At the same time, the British and zamindari long-term neglect for agriculture increased the difficulty for the average Indian family to avoid working for the Raj. Even regions like Punjab which had increasing levels of wages suffered from famine. Congress Party leaders were largely uncertain how to take advantage of the situation. While Gandhi launched the Quit India movement and detested foreign soldiers on Indian soil, he did not call for an entire sabotage or even a peaceful hartal against the war effort; rather, he called for the Indians involved to act on their own consciences according to their own situation. Khan argues that it solidified anti-war sentiment despite its less dramatic character. Ironically, due to the War, the previously banned Indian communists now emerged from the underground as allies with the Raj against fascism.

The Raj at War highlighted how this era was truly contradictory and confusing, with South Asia pulled at both sides--Independence through fighting for the Indian National Army and thus aligning with the Japanese? Loyalty to the Raj? For example, writer K. A. Abbas wrote about his anti-fascist inclinations, but also disillusionment with the Raj. Yet India did not lack activists who directly opposed the Raj: The younger generations approached the issue more radically. Quit India activist Aruna Asaf Ali disregarded her husband Asaf Ali’s more moderate approach. She was regarded by the people as the modern day Rani of Jhansi and successfully evaded police search through a game of cat-and-mouse up till 1946. Moreover, there was a huge gap between military and non-military people’s political opinions, and even when they argued with one another, usually none were convinced. Similar to the starving Indian, the Nepali soldiers also lacked agency in the choice, since slavery was just recently abolished and their king volunteered to support the war effort. Karnad also cited how Parsis were traditionally loyal British subjects, even as his own family tried to deter men from entering direct service. Rather than outright support of swaraj, both books showed that the politics of Indians were in flux in the 1940s.

Aruna Asaf Ali

Aruna Asaf Ali

The Japanese were not the ideal allies for the Indian freedom fighters, since they also harbored imperial ambitions. Subhas Chandra Bose ceremonially celebrated the Andaman islands as territory under his government Azad Hind, even though in reality the Japanese authorities did not cede sovereignty. Under the influence of the Axis propaganda as well as material concerns, many Indian soldiers in South East Asia changed sides: Leaflets urged them to join INA and pursue self-determination against the Raj. Still, the INA was a dwarf in comparison to the giant British Indian Army.

Pilots of Azad Hind Sena, part of INA

Arguably, Indian soldiers for the first time fought for their own sovereignty from the Japanese, even though it was under a foreign master’s command. The Andaman and Nicobar islands were occupied in 1942 and many Indian cities were bombed by the Japanese Army. There were also intertwined destinies between Burma and India as the Raj’s subjects: the Japanese invasion caused many refugees of Indian origins flee from Burma. Many of the poor died on the way due to malaria or starvation.

Still, the War at large a British concern. The subjects who were usually loyal to British interests, such as rulers of princely states and North East tea plantation owners, donated many resources for the war effort. Others involved usually had no political stake, such as the Imphal jail convicts used for carrying loads or the Naga porters who facilitated refugees evacuation, or the tea plantation laborers who participated in building the India-China Ledo road and aerodromes. Even those Indians who did not support the War also could not outright deny the need for it, such as Nehru, who abhorred fascists but also wanted independence. In reality, this meant that the Raj got what it needed.

The war effort diverted most of the resources away from the Indian people. Viceroy Lord Linlithgow to a large extent disregarded the issue and spent no efforts lobbying on behalf of the situation. The viceroy who succeeded Linlithgow also tried to lobby the British parliament to send more grains for relief, but only achieved the promise for a quarter of what he asked. Khan equivocated and pointed to different reasons of the Bengal Famine, such as Bengal’s over reliance on rice, even while she cited evidence of the British being primarily culpable. Many famine victims saw the war as the cause of their plight. The Raj’s premature scorch earth policy destroyed and requisitioned a lot of boats of the fishermen. In comparison to Khan, historian Madhusree Mukerjee argues for a more direct causal link between the Bengal famine and the war effort. She wrote, that Raj’s readiness “to use the resources of India to wage war against Germany and Japan” was the primary reason for the famine. But given theories put forth by Amartya Sen (hoarders were the most responsible for famine), it is difficult to assess due to the varying statistics regarding how much grain was available after grain was given to war efforts.

Why did the British also forget the loyal subjects, especially the troops? This was mostly due to the idea of racial superiority as well as indifference to the native population during as well after the War. For example, when the Indian troops serving outside of India received better equipment than the natives defending the motherland. Winston Churchill, who was notorious for his racism and disdain, had said “by putting modern weapons in the hands of sepoys,” commanders were creating a Frankenstein. The former Commander in Chief Claude Auchinleck proposed the British government to establish a memorial for the men who serviced “Britain and the Empire” for the past two hundred years as well as in the “Old World” territories. But the proposal was delayed due to disagreement over the memorial site, then no funds were acquired and the plan for the memorial was discarded in 1949.

The major difference between the two books, aside from the sources, is that Karnad provides a more existential assessment of World War II: The White Man battled in sites that upheld Western civilization. The “Black men sent running and shooting in the jungle” such as Bobby’s army, would in comparison be seen as “ants disputing anthills.” The purpose of protecting democracy is elusive to most of the colonies; in “North and East Africa, in the Middle East and India’s North-West frontier,” both World Wars had the “climate of imperial control and contestation.” Karnad points out that behind supposed ideological differences between Axis and Allied powers, Germany and Japan “had mainly copied and outstripped Britain’s own example” of empire. He argued that the imperial war continues in different forms, such as 2008 drones over the village Datta Khel, where the Air Force also flew and battled. In contrast, Khan is much more measured in her assessments and hesitant to draw these solely regressive connections. She acknowledges the irony that Commonwealth soldiers helped in liberating Ethiopia from Italy’s colonialism, but the effects on Indian soldiers’ politics are hard to document. She also writes about black G.I.s and Indian soldiers sharing of notions of equality and visions of a new world order. She also addresses how some people viewed the Army as a modernizing force, and cites the increasing level of literacy among soldiers. Through both books’ new narratives, the nature of the War and the impacts on British colonies has become much clearer, but not necessarily clear enough. Further work needs to be done on the relationship between colonialism and the World Wars, with a focus on post-colonial countries and their positions during the Wars as well as the Wars' effects on subsequent nationalism and decolonization.

Edited from a paper for a JNU history course. Please contact me if readers need a footnoted version.

Inequality in the Business of Surrogacy

Carvings of men and women on Jagdish Temple, Udaipur. Photo credits: Adrian

Last month, Dr. Sheela Saravanan gave an excellent colloquium talk based on her research of commercial surrogacy in Gujarat. She highlighted the economic and legal inequality in these transactions. For example, Indian surrogates are not even given the copy of the contract and have little knowledge of the legal guidelines, while US surrogates have a choice over closed or open contract and choose the closeness of the ongoing relationship between her and the intended parents. The participants of the colloquium asked great questions, such as the role of doctors. Doctors have a lot of power to conduct this business and there seemed to be minimal regulation; there is still no authoritative data on the number of surrogate births in India. A Mumbai doctor in the business once even replied to Saravanan’s persistent questioning, “We are doing a favor for the mothers.” Another question asked the caste background of the surrogate mothers. One of the clinics Saravanan researched had a book of surrogate profiles for the intended parents to browse. In that book, most of the intended parents ask about religion and usually wanted mothers to be of the same religion. Furthermore, if the surrogate mother was a Brahmin, then she could receive more money. If one is better looking then one would also have higher chances of being chosen from the book. Yet this process does not occur in the reverse: the surrogate would not choose the parents or sometimes not even the number of fetuses inserted in her body.

Inequality between the global north and south pervades medical tourism. Indian film Ship of Theseus poses bioethics questions in one of the segment where an illegal organ trader poached a poor Indian man one of his kidneys. The organ trader provided it to man who needed a new kidney in Europe who knew nothing about the source. Later two Indian good Samaritans traced down the European man and questioned him about this problem. The European man coughs up more money for the man who lost a kidney, yet one of the Indians saw this act as an easy way for the European man to buy out of his guilt. The segment ends with the good Samaritans bringing the Indian man the money but still feeling ambivalent regarding the nature of the trade. Surrogates who sign up for money in the global south also are susceptible to deceit. The 10-minute documentary Mothers Anonymous shows that surrogates who give birth to twins or triplets may not always receive the promised compensation and have few legal channels of dispute. Saravanan noted in her paper on surrogacy that “Asymmetries of individual capacity (knowledge, contacts and financial capability) lead to trust amongst actors. This trusting process results in experiences that can either be positive or potentially exploitative.”

But the starkest aspect related to surrogacy among the many forms of medical tourism is the gender aspect. Many kinds of medical tourism arguably can become more transparent and legally regulated for both parties, but the gender issue of surrogacy will still remain a stickler: the social contract has been conveniently neutralizing patriarchy in legalese, and the same may happen to surrogacy. Sarvanan writes,

In her book, The Social Contract, Carole Pateman critiques the social contract theory and asserts that patriarchal control prevails in the marriage contract, the prostitution contract, and the contract for surrogate motherhood. She claims surrogacy contracts are the means by which women’s reproductive capacities are dominated and patriarchy is upheld. In Feminist Morality, Virginia Held regards the social contract theory as inadequate in representing children and women and in capturing the meaningful moral relationship between people.

Surrogates may read, understand and sign a surrogacy contract, but the contract would not signify the same amount of shame and guilt as for a person to read, understand and sign a contract for trading in his or her kidney. Cultural baggage is attached to surrogacy in the South Asian context. While some think that being a surrogate mother is fine for money in an otherwise a conservative society, with patriarchy in mind, I still found it hard to believe that women can ever pursue this chance in the open: understandably many work in collaboration with their husbands and immediate family to keep this as a secret. Another gender question: how does surrogacy threaten the social understanding and definition of motherhood? The surrogate mothers in the documentary feel emotion attachment to the babies, even though they are not genetically related. (In contrast, the popular trope regarding men is that they expect their offspring to be genetically “theirs.”) Women around the world face critiques that they are selling their wombs, which should somehow be regarded as a sanctified zone. Motherhood seems to mean legal ownership of the child, but in the case of surrogacy without the same amount of effort, which is so often labeled as “sacrifice.” The intended parent also may not experience the typical birth defining motherhood but still expects to enjoy all the experiences with “her” child thereafter.

Many surrogates rationalize their decision by citing their economic needs and contribution to family income, as seen in the documentary. This attitude poses is a stark contrast with another group of women who also earn money for their family in Pakistan. Zehran Yasmin Zaidi’s Chaddors and Pink Collars in Pakistan: Gender, Work, and the Global Economy shows in one chapter that oftentimes women can

participate in non-traditional employment outside of home, but requires women to observe cultural norms in non-work related matters. The dynamics of this process can be understood by examining how class and gender operate in Pakistan. Many women workers who were interviewed by the author came from working-class backgrounds, yet made contradictory claims about working out of choice rather than economic necessity.

But in both cases, women earn approval through bringing financial gains to the family despite the acts are against previous convention.

Unfortunately there was not a lot of anthropological data on the gender questions: who makes the decision to become surrogates in the family and what are the different opinions of the informed participants (e.g. Fathers, mothers, in-laws)? How does gender relations impact the surrogates’ economic “rationality?” The intentions are very elusive, compounded with layers of ethics and gender politics. I speculate that it is possible that both sides who are participating in this transaction would not even approve of this kind of deal when asked in a polling exercise.

Heightened Nationalism in Times of Emergency

A month ago, some friends and I got into a heated discussion on the necessity of partition and the role of Islam in Pakistan politics. Both Amir and Bilal, students in Germany, argued for the necessity of partition and the role of Islam in law and politics. Many other Pakistanis also vest their trust in the centralized executive power and the Pakistani military. Last week the Taliban in Pakistan led several attacks that targeted Shia Muslims. One of the Pakistanis here lost a dear relative in the most recent attacks in a Peshawar mosque. While many friends consoled him in wake of the tragedy, it did not seem to change much in their outlook on politics. During the consolation, many of the discussed fervently about their views on terrorism in Pakistan, all of which seemed to be a dissatisfaction with the current situation, and demand immediate action and reaction. The military or the executive branch seem to be the go-to solution. I have heard about crises in a political philosophy (e.g. Carl Schmitt), but no other place seemed to be more crisis-ridden than Pakistan. In classes, I am also reminded of the omniscient energy of nationalism that seeps into every day life in India. In both countries, there are not enough restrictions on the demand for action and reclamation, especially in times when a group considers defending oneself. 

The political identity of "Hindus" rose in the 19th century partly in response to the threat of Christianity, social Darwinism and the growing consciousness of Otherness. Islam in South Asia also adapted to different times, which I have written about in Islamic Reform, South Asia, and Self-Reflection. These religious identities that adapted to new labels and contexts play an influential role in 20th century politics, including Hindu nationalism. In 1990, BJP politician L.K. Advani's Rath Yatra sparked riots that left many dead in Gujarat. In 1992, the demolishing of the Babri Masjid led to sectarian violence in other Indian provinces as well in which many Muslims were massacred. Documentaries Ram Ke Naam, Boy in the Branch and Men in the Tree show the ideological roots of Ayodhya conflict and the new wave of Hindu nationalism. Many Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) volunteers known as the kar sevaks (servers-in-action) were mobilized around the country. Even though the men could not keep up their RSS activities after Ayodhya due to pressures of earning a living, They still believed in the cause and felt proud having participated in the momentous event, with statements like “I was on the dome” or “I cleared the debris.” The temple had been a source of political contest between Hindu and Muslim communities since the 1940s. Why did the movement happen in the 1990s? Even though there are theories of elite conspiracy, other factors also contributed to the acceptance of Hindu nationalist ideology. 

Arvind Rajagopal’s Politics after Television documented the political effects on popular opinion from the widely followed commercial television series Ramayana. The book highlighted the role of the television and mass media in shaping peoples’ understanding of society. We have learned in class that the TV adaptation that started playing in 1987 is a uniquely North Indian and Sanskritized interpretation of a story that actually has many versions. But it clearly influenced many viewers. For example, more than one interviewee in Politics of Television, Mr. Jha, longed for a moral rule by Lord Ram-- "At the time of the Ramayan people used to say that everything is truth. Now there is truth in nothing. All 'departments' [sic] are corrupt. It wasn’t like this before – and this is the difference. Of course, even then there was poverty, but even the poor were knowledgeable and honest. Today, the wealthy and educated men are the most corrupt." Hindu nationalist thus “used religious appeals to distinguish itself from the unscrupulous majority of politicians in returning to politics a long-awaited dharma, a sense of duty and righteousness.”

The opening of Ram Ke Naam also shows how video clips serve as a good source for sharing religious experiences as well as political messages, mixing truth with myths. Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and co. clearly take advantage of the rise of mass communication, which has becomes a tool of expression as well as propaganda for the resourceful. In the documentary, court appointed priest at the disputed Ramjanmabhoomi Temple Pujari Laldas is interviewed at length. He replies to “What do you think of the VHP’s plan to build a temple?” --

Screenshot of Laldas from Ram Ke Naam

This is a political game played by the VHP. There was never a ban on building temples (during the Mughal times). Besides, according to our tradition, any place where the idols of God are kept, is a temple. That's the Hindu custom. ... And even if they wanted to build a separate temple, why demolish a structure where idols already exist? Those who want to do this are actually more interested in creating tensions in India in order to cash in on the Hindu vote. They don't care about the genocide that will occur, how many will be killed, how much destroyed, or even about what will happen to Hindus in Muslim majority areas. ... Muslim rulers granted land for Hindu temples, like Janki Ghat and parts of Hanuman Garhi were built by Muslims.

Just like what Laldas has observed, in previous riots, there were many Hindu politicians that stress differences and cut cleavages between the two communities to gain votes. Sadhus would defend and legitimize politicians with their spiritual currency and profit from political allies. Steven Wilkinson has shown that riots and deaths tend to "cluster in the months before elections, and then drop off sharply in the months after an election is held.” The Gujarat elections were scheduled in 2003 and the BJP just lost two cities' municipal elections in 200. While the documentaries did not depict the riots in 2002, previous incidents had similar context. Like the kar sevaks interviewed in The Men in the Tree, Naredra Modi is also a former RSS cadre member. Jaffrelot shows that then Gujarat chief minister Modi orchestrated a retaliation to the Godhra train incident in 2002 and even ordered police officers not to contain the consequent Hindu backlash. Yet Modi refused to acknowledge his role in inciting riots by making the dead nationalists a spectacle on TV and argued that the Hindu backlashes were spontaneous. (The VHP even published a manual to teach its activists to make planned riots appear as spontaneous acts of violence.) Several anonymous civil servants leaked to human rights investigators that Gujarat ministers directed the advance of the assailants from the “city police control room” of Ahmedabad. (p5) During the backlash, local BJP and VHP leaders also were out in the streets alongside the attackers and suffered no consequence afterwards.

In contrast to his actions that effectively absolved responsibility of Hindu rioters, Modi stated that the train attack was a pre-planned act of terrorism, even though evidence showed otherwise: the train only stopped after repeated harassment of the Hindu nationalists. Jaffrelot points to another political strategy: the thorough diffusion of Hindutva in reaction to a fear of Jihad. Jaffrelot shows that the Indian state has encouraged and indulged the use of labeling (Muslim) reactions to Hindu violence as "terrorism." The deployment of anti-terrorism discourse is distinct from the "communal" character of riots in the 1990s.

Not only was the BJP campaign rife with anti-Muslim references, but it was also based on an obvious equation between Islam and terrorism. One of the BJP's television commercials began with the sound of a train pulling into a station, followed by the clamor of riots and women's screams before the ringing of temple bells was covered by the din of automatic rifle fire. After which, Modi's reassuring countenance appeared, hinting to voters that only he could protect Gujarat from such violence. The BJP Election Manifesto pledged to train Gujarat youth, particularly those living on the Pakistani border, in anti-terrorist tactics. Self defense militias would beset up in border towns where large numbers of retired servicemen would be brought in. Special gun permits would be issued to the lifeblood of a nation under siege.

Yet even if the parties and organizations like BJP, VHP and RSS instigated and organized many of these riots, this fact does not exonerate the "ordinary Hindus" nor does it explain Hindutva's hegemony at this time. In Mass Movement or Elite Conspiracy? The Puzzle of Hindu Nationalism, Basu argues that "ordinary men and women were informed by their antipathy toward the state," previously mostly represented by the Congress Party. (p56) Indeed, as one of the leaders in Congress Party, Rajiv Gandhi undermined secularism when he supported very conservative Muslims in a decision denying alimony to a divorced Muslim woman, Shah Bano. Rajiv Gandhi pandered to a clerical elite and Muslim orthodoxy rather than a more feminist and secularist decision. This political mistake was exploited by the Hindu right and termed this as “pseudo-secularism” and favored minorities The BJP only addressed sections previously neglected by Indian politicians and could not be reduced to a simple allegiance to Hinduism. Basu argues that "the middle classes may support the BJP because they favor a stronger, more authoritarian state with more ambitious foreign policy objectives, whereas slum dwellers may support the BJP because it promises to legalize their dwellings." I was shocked when I got to know a Gottingen student who is an Indian Muslim BJP supporter for Modi's pro-development stance, but now I am understanding his alliance since he is from a middle class.
In the end, defending a group identity seems to be a great response to crisis, even though I would prefer to mourn and heal. Yet a violence response can also serve as an answer to many contradictions and uncomfortable questions---The Pakistani government indulged in calls for hanging the culprits of the Peshawar military school attack (Sharif lifted the ban on death sentences for acts of terrorism), while the Jordanian one executed the female bomber prisoner in response to the tragic death of the Jordanian pilot under ISIS. 

Islamic Reform, South Asia, and Self-Reflection

I revisited the thoughts of Islamic reformers such as Abul A'la Mawdudi (or Maududi) after two years, albeit in different contexts, and the material still very riveting. I first read Indian-born Pakistani Islamist scholar Mawdudi in a Theocracy to Democracy course. The course discussed ranging opinions on the state of religion and politics in Europe, the U.S., and Islamic countries. The course did not specify which Islamic country, since the authors we read, including Sayyid Qutb, had enormous international influence on how people viewed Islam and politics. Based on the theme, we focused on sharia law and the question whether our "rights" come from a divine justification (in Chinese there is also the saying "天赋人权," God-given rights), and if so, what will justify our rights after secularization. I saw many shared anxieties between the Islamic reformers and the Chinese reformers of the early 20th century. The readings gave me the impression that Islamic reformists focused creating societies governed by Islamic mores as opposed to the "Western lifestyle." The Islamic reformers are very relevant and champion many supporters, some which became terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden. Since the Theocracy to Democracy course placed terrorists in a transnational context, I did not think of any country specifically. 

Only today after reading the 2008 article Islamic Reform and Modernities in South Asia did I realize how the transnational exchange between Islamic reformers could not have happened without the reification of Islam, or how Islam became to be conceptualized as a system. Mawdudi was one of the first to describe Islam as a system and this idea also became popularized through subsequent "how-to-be-a-good-believer" guides. In the sharp analysis Robinson points out 

this reification process stemmed in part, too, from two additional influences: the distancing impact of print that enabled Muslims to stand apart from their faith, analyse and conceptualise it, and their growing consciousness, which was especially strong in India, that they were living alongside other faiths, at times real competitors, which were also reified, or being so. For the first time, in the late nineteenth century, Muslims begin to use the term ‘Islam’ not just to describe their relationship to God but also to describe an ideal religious pattern, or a mundane religious system, or even just Islamic civilisation. (276)

I also saw the close connection between Mawdudi and South Asian realities. This is not a coincidence, since one of my Modern Indian Studies course assigned this article written by British scholar of Islam, Dr. Francis Robinson. Islamic reformers in South Asia sought to root out "indigenous customs that had come to be incorporated into Islamic practice, for instance, following the Hindu custom of not marrying widows." (262) In the 1920s, the Sunni Islamic reform school of Deoband and its political counterpart pressured "the colonial state to remove all elements of custom from the personal law." (275) Only in this light can one realize the oversimplification that sees reformed Islam as the sole competing force with Western secularism and "rationality." In the South Asian context, Islam has been in competition with the modern versions of Hinduism. 

Robinson argues that the spread of Islam as a system depended on the circulation of print--

the introduction of print and the translation of the Qur’an and large numbers of important texts into the regional languages of India. The reforming ‘ulama were amongst the very first to use the printing press; rightly, they saw it as the means to fashion and to consolidate their constituency outside the bounds of colonial rule. Reform, moreover, reached beyond the world of the literate. From the 1920s, it was carried forward by the Tabligh-i Jama‘at, or preaching society, in which the devout set aside a period each year to work in teams that transmitted the reforming message orally to small town and village communities.

Circulation of printed texts was one of the two ways in which Islamic scholars of the Deoband school advocated for itjihad (independent reasoning) over taqlid (tradition of precedent). Before, person-to-person transmission of ‘the golden chain of sincere Muslims’ was a model, which expanded to "embrace sufis, the Shia and the descendants of the Prophet" generally. Spiritual

authority is derived from linkage to the origins of the tradition through an unbroken chain of personal transmission. Central is the belief that truth does not reside in documents... but in ‘authentic human beings and their personal connections with one another’. (266)

The second way was to contact directly with the Qur’an and Hadith without former interpretations and make "them relevant to the modern world." Deobandis "cast aside a thousand years of intellectual effort in fashioning a Muslim society," with Mawdudi taking the lead (267). This turn was possibly considering that the Muslim intellectual world saw a crisis at the end of the Turkish Khilafat between 1919 and 1923. Robinson believes that since the past decade, Islamic reformism has achieved success for coming to terms with modernity and answering modern anxieties, after surveying much evidence that shows how "Islamic reform both opened the way to modernity and then worked with it." (279)

Darul Uloom Deoband is an Islamic school in India where the Deobandi Islamic movement was started. It is located at Deoband, a town in Saharanpur district of Uttar Pradesh, India

Robinson's article also shows the less politically-charged aspects of these Islamic reformers' thoughts, such as the emphasis on an individual's daily self-reflection and ethics. Individual reflection grew increasingly significant in a modern Muslim's religious life. In order to be a good believer, "Muslims had to ask themselves regularly if they had done all in their power to submit to God and to carry out His will in the world. " (272) Deobandi reformer Ashraf ‘Ali Thanwi called for regular self-examination, morning and evening, "to ensure purity of intentions and to avoid wrongdoing." (272)  New trends emerging in the Prophet's biographies oppose to my impression of Islamic reform as "political Islam"--

Muhammad is depicted not as the ‘perfect man’ of the Sufi tradition, but as the perfect person. Less attention, as Cantwell Smith has pointed out, is given to his intelligence, political sagacity and capacity to harness the new social forces in his society and much more to his qualities as a good middle-class family man: his sense of duty and his loving nature, and his qualities as a good citizen, his consideration for others and in particular those who are less fortunate. ... the concern is less with what the individual might have contributed to Islamic civilisation and more on his life in his time and his human qualities. (273)

This aspect of Islam is not directly related to either courses' themes, one which discusses separation of religion and politics and one which explores 20th century religious movements relation to nationhood. But I personally found it very intriguing since I reflect a lot. My Muslim friend Maaz also said that he looks into the mirror often and asks himself if he had done the right things that day or week. I once thought it was just like Confucius who once said that he reflects three times a day (吾日三省吾身). After reading Islamic Reform and Modernities in South Asia I also saw the link between Islam and this practice.