عيسى بلومي يكتب عن تعطش العالم لموارد اليمن والحرب

"اليمن فتاكة"

المثل الإقليمي-

يستكشف المؤرخ عيسى بلومي الأسباب طويلة المدى للإهمال العالمي للحرب في اليمن ، مثل التصورات الاقتصادية والأيديولوجية.

مترجم من كتابه تدمير اليمن.

تُظهر الأمم المتحدة إحجامًا عن الاعتراف بكارثة المجاعة بسبب ثلاث سنوات من الحصار. في الواقع ، كشفت الأمم المتحدة في صيف عام 2016 عن لحظات ارتباك محرجة ، حيث أدان مسئولون من المستوى الأدنى الجرائم السعودية إلا أن مسئولي الأمين العام السابق للأمم المتحدة بان كي مون تراجعوا عنها. تحت قيادة بان كي مون ، لم تشرع الأمم المتحدة في إجراء تحقيق في ذلك الوقت.

 . على النقيض من هذا الموقف في سوريا ، من الواضح أن الأمم المتحدة تخدم مصالح أطراف معينة فقط.

تحت غطاء قرار الأمم المتحدة (في حالتنا ، قرار مجلس الأمن رقم 2216) ، أذنت المملكة العربية السعودية (السعودية) والولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لنفسها باستخدام العنف في اليمن. بحجة إعادة الحكومة "الشرعية" "المعترف بها" ، فإنهم يدعمون علنًا بقوة مميتة معتبرة نظامًا مرتبطًا بعبد ربه منصور هادي (من الآن فصاعدًا هادي).

نادرًا ما نوقشت الظروف غير المقبولة حقًا التي وجد اليمنيون أنفسهم يعيشون في ظلها خلال حكومة هادي المؤقتة. في وقت استيلاء أنصار الله على العاصمة ، اعترف أولئك الذين يعيشون في اليمن إلى حد كبير بأن إدارة هادي فاسدة وغير كفؤة بشكل مفرط.

ربما كان الشاغل الأكبر لليمنيين من جميع النواحي السياسية والثقافية والاقتصادية هو إدراك أن هذه "الحكومة المؤقتة" المفترضة أخذت على عاتقها ، دون إشراف برلماني ، دفع "إصلاحات" التحرر الاقتصادي إلى الأمام التي وضعت الكثير بشكل غير قانوني. من الأصول العامة اليمنية معروضة للبيع. الأكثر إشكالية هو أن المستفيدين الرئيسيين كانوا أجانب.

 على مدى القرن الماضي كانت هناك حالات عديدة من التدخل الأجنبي في جنوب الجزيرة العربية. سواء كانت حملات "إنسانية" أو "تنموية" مصادق عليها من قبل منظمات متعددة الأطراف مثل الأمم المتحدة أو ضربات طائرات بدون طيار غير مصرح بها بقيادة القوات العسكرية الأمريكية ، فإن مثل هذه التفاعلات مع اليمن لها تأثير عالمي بقدر ما لها بصمة محلية. إن دراسة مثل هذه التدخلات عن كثب لا تساعدنا فقط على فهم العالم الحديث ولكن تذكرنا أيضًا كيف أن الأجواء العالمية هي مجال الشعوب التي تتجاوز الذكور البيض في العالم الأوروبي الأمريكي. لهذا السبب ، هناك قيمة مضافة لتقديم تحليل تاريخي أكثر تفصيلاً لمشاركة هذه القوات مع اليمن.

في معظم التواريخ الأوروبية الأمريكية في العالم المعاصر ، بالكاد تحتل اليمن أي هامش. وفقًا لهذه الكتب ، "اكتشف" التجار البرتغاليون والهولنديون والجنوفيون اليمن في القرن السادس عشر ، ومثل سكان أستراليا أو الأمريكتين ، أصبح اليمنيون وإنتاجيتهم هدفًا ذا قيمة استراتيجية للغرباء فقط بعد أن بدأ هؤلاء الرجال الغربيون العقلانيون. للاستغلال وبالتالي الربح من منطقة "غير مستغلة" اقتصاديًا.

1920 فترة

في القرن العشرين ، اكتشفت المصالح الرأسمالية الأمريكية الأوروبية طرقًا لدمج اليمن بشكل أفضل في نظامهم العالمي المتطور ، وهي عملية جردت اليمنيين بالضرورة من دورهم التاريخي كمحرك اقتصادي وثقافي وروحي وسياسي لمعظم دول المحيط الهندي. .

منذ عشرينيات القرن الماضي ، كان اليمنيون منيعين عن دعوات المصالح القوية مثل شركة فورد أو الجيولوجيين الممول من روكفلر. عند التعامل مع العالم الخارجي ، رأى الإمام يحيى وحلفاؤه أن البريطانيين هم المشكلة. إن استخدام السعوديين كحليف ، إن لم يكن كأداة فظة صريحة للبريطانيين ، سيظل نقطة مرجعية لحسابات اليمنيين. كان هذا هو الحال بشكل خاص مع الأراضي في الشمال التي لا يزال توجهها الثقافي والتجاري والاستراتيجي يجعلها حتى اليوم مناطق "يمنية" تحتلها الدولة السعودية.

حدثت سلسلة من الحملات التجارية الأمريكية إلى شمال اليمن. وزاروا حكومة الإمام في محاولة لكسر الحظر الذي حاولت سلطات عدن فرضه على جارهم المحارب. وُصفت أولاً بزيارات "حسن النية" ، وسرعان ما سافرت عدة وفود من رجال الأعمال على الطرق الطويلة إلى المرتفعات اليمنية.

يبدو أن Twitchell كان أول أمريكي يحشد المساعدات لخدمة مصالح الرأسماليين الأمريكيين في شبه الجزيرة العربية.

عرض T المساعدة الفنية التي تضمنت وضع التصاميم لطريق الحديدة الجديد إلى صنعاء (وجميع الجسور والجدران المعززة التي استلزمها) أجرى مسوحات لشمال اليمن وتفقد جيولوجيا البلاد وكتابة تقارير عن نوعها. من الاستثمارات في البنية التحتية كانت هناك حاجة لبدء عملية تعدين واسعة النطاق . هذه الأنشطة تزعج الإمام.

مراسلون غربيون يزورون أحمد 

 اليمن

 كان ابن يحيى محمد حميد الدين

 

الاستنتاجات التي خلصت إليها هذه الحملات التي بدأت في عام 1920 اعترفت بأن اليمن كان غنيًا للغاية. يستحق اليمن الشمالي ، الغني بالزراعة والمحملة بالمعادن ، بما في ذلك البترول ، الاهتمام الفوري من حكومة الولايات المتحدة. بالنظر إلى موجة الضغط التي أعقبت ذلك ، عرف الإمام وحلفاؤه ما يفعلونه ومع من كانوا يتعاملون.

من المحتمل أن تتجاوز ثروة اليمن المعدنية ثروة الخليج. بمرور الوقت ، ستصبح كنوزها مرة أخرى مركزًا للاستراتيجيات الاحتكارية. قدمت الحسابات الإستراتيجية للملك عبد العزيز ، الذي احتضن فريق Crane-Twitchell التابع لشركة Standard Oil of California ، بداية الاعتراف بأن الولايات المتحدة لا تريد حربًا شاملة على ما اعتقدوا بشكل متزايد أنه سيكون تحت سيطرتها. محيط التأثير. هذه المحاولة للربط بين العلاقات الجيدة مع اليمن الشمالي مع توسع أمريكا المستمر في بقية شبه الجزيرة العربية حددت طبيعة العنف في المنطقة لنصف القرن المقبل.

صراع قصير العمر للوصول إلى الإمام الموعود بعقود من المؤامرات مثل الاقتصاد السياسي للنفط ، وتمزيق أجزاء من إفريقيا والأمريكتين وأماكن أخرى في الشرق الأوسط ، وغزو اليمن أيضًا. على سبيل المثال ، قامت شركة Rockefeller Standard Oil Company الشهيرة بتكليف رحلات استكشافية بقيادة الجيولوجي الفرنسي ، فيكتور ل.

وأعقب ذلك زيارة أميركي سوري اسمه أمين الريحاني عام 1921-1922. كان لدى كلتا البعثتين ، القادمتين من زوايا مختلفة ، نية واضحة لتسهيل الاتفاقات الأقل رسمية التي لم ترق إلى الاعتراف السياسي والدعم الدبلوماسي ، لكنها كانت متقدمة بما يكفي لاستكشاف إمكانية تمويل مشاريع بناء الطرق والجسور. كان السبب دائمًا ثروة اليمن الجيولوجية.

من جانبه ، أراد العربي الأمريكي أمين الريحاني أن يدعي أن لديه علاقة خاصة مع الإمام وعمل ساعيًا يحمل رسائل شخصية إلى رئيس الولايات المتحدة ، والقنصل في عدن .

كان تشارلز كرين ، الذي يمثل النفط الأمريكي الكبير ، يأمل في الحصول على امتيازات النفط والمعادن من الإمام. لكن بدون دعم دبلوماسي كامل من واشنطن ، كان على رجال الأعمال الأمريكيين اللجوء إلى تكتيكات جديدة. لم يكن يحيى يتنازل عما يريده هؤلاء الزوار الأمريكيون بوضوح. قد تكون هذه هي النقطة عندما يقدم السلك الدبلوماسي الأمريكي عرضه الأول لمساعدة الشركات على "التنمية".

رأت النخب في شمال اليمن من تفاعلاتها المتكررة مع الأمريكيين والبريطانيين أنهم وجهان لعملة واحدة صكتها الإمبراطورية.

كما نشهد في حملة تدمير اليمن منذ عام 2015 ، كانت أهم أداة للإمبراطورية التي زرعها الممثلون البريطانيون لرأس المال العالمي منذ عام 1902 هي التحالف الذي تم تشكيله مع المملكة العربية السعودية ، وهو تحالف قائم آنذاك كما هو الحال اليوم. كان هذا التحالف للعديد من الأنظمة السياسية الإقليمية ، بما في ذلك الهاشميين ، سببًا كافيًا لليمنيين لتبني استراتيجيات تبدو متناقضة. كما تمت مناقشته لاحقًا ، أدت المقاومة المستمرة للعنف البريطاني / السعودي إلى إضعاف اليمنيين تدريجياً حيث بدأت الإمبراطورية لأول مرة لتسخير تنوع في الإسلام (يشمل التكفير) لتدمير استقلال اليمن.

Is the concept of the military institution a Eurocentric one?

The modern-liberal paradigm assumes that the people who serve in any military is or should be divorced from politics. One should not have a particular allegiance, charismatic or otherwise, with their bosses or leaders. Within histories that have been written in a similar vein, the military in any non-European country is merely one of the many institutions playing catch-up with Eurocentric models of sovereignty. 

However, if we observe the history of Middle Eastern society without assuming a teleological narrative that culminates in the modern nation state, then we would possibly see that the military institution similarly did not have a smooth path toward the current model. The following sections will shift focus to scholarship of the Middle East. 

Shah Ismail I, Sheikh of the Safavi tariqa, founder of the Safavid dynasty, commander-in-chief of the Kizilbash Armies

Scholars of modernity and Islam have noted how colonialism and other factors have influenced histories of social organizations such as the ulama. There is a common method that looks for knowledge within the ulama, and historians are possibly biased in this respect, since the ulama is the institution that most resembles the current-day university. However, if one does not presume that soldiers are without a culture, then the rich history of Kurdish Alevis, Albanian Betakshis as well as Arab Shi'i tribes would be of great use for writing an alternative history of knowledge. A new method of history must review the bifurcation of "the people who fight" and "the people who study" as interlinked and criss-crossing, rather than atemporally distinct. Studies of Sufism such as the Naqshbandis have made very important contributions in this regard (see a quote on the similarities of ideas in Sufism and Shi'ism in footnote 1).

Worshippers circle the shrine of El-Sayed El-Badawi; this mawlid is considered Egypt's most famous. Tanta, Egypt, Oct 16, 2014. Mosa'ab Elshamy

The transmission of Shi'ism and affective ideas of Shi'ism in regions such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the Gulf cannot be told separate of its military aspect. There are serious lack of comparisons in knowledge and ideas in this respect. Current scholarship generally assumes that the ulama has a greater say in matters of Islamic theology and doctrine. The divorce of certain Islamic practices from textual knowledge has been rightly pinned on colonial intervention and the rise of the nation-state. But what role has historians played in this process of privileging the ulama as an institution of knowledge? Paradoxically, the military as a modern phenomenon has also been studied as an important site of reform. Many military personnel from the Ottoman Empire accepted European training and played a decisive role in introducing new ideas that still reverberate in modern politics. Interested readers might look into the episodes of Ottoman History Podcast that devote to this particular subject, such as Military Education and the Last Ottoman Generation and Jafar al-Askari: Modernization, Martial Discipline and Post-Ottoman Iraq. Yet "military" and "education" in some histories have taken on a modernizing narrative trend, in which there could not have been educated military personnel before the advent of European knowledge. This neglects the alternative modes of education prior to European influence and/or colonization. Modernity in some aspects were imported, but cultural memory remained attached to alternative notions of justice and war, such as jihad. In this aspect, one could delve into earlier times, or review the interwar period with an even more skeptical view of modernity.

To recover jihad from a colonial and stereotypical view of jihadis or fanatics, one must recuperate military traditions within the context of Islamic history as well. Shiism is particularly an interesting facet to look at these issues, since they have provided significant alternative concepts of jihad. Recovering different modes of military knowledge can also help us revisit the erroneous assumptions that the Middle East was hegemonically dominated by one form of Islam.  

Footnote:
1. Quote from How to Conceptualize Ottoman Sunnitization by Derin Terzioğlu

Day Trippin' Tripoli, the one in Sham

Tripoli, aka Tarābulus / Tarabulus al-Sham, was not on top of my list of tourist destinations. Like many millenials who travel to Lebanon, I had watched the Vice documentary about the armed urban conflict and decided best to stay away from Tripoli. My Airbnb flatmates Ian and Dan held a similar impression of the city when they arrived in Lebanon for their holiday. Dan was especially worried that something wrong might happen. Ian was eager to see the city because it is closer in architectural style to his hometown, Damascus, than Beirut. But our host Ibrahim said that it is a cool city and showed us a short documentary on the reconstruction efforts since the conflict. I was also hoping we could visit the bookstore that burned. 


We set off on July 15 and made jokes about getting shot by crossfire. The same jovial middle-aged Lebanese driver who took us to Jounieh also found us again and offered to take us to Tripoli as well. At first he did not even recognize us, even though I think we stand out as a odd group of tourists. Ian, who continued to act as our trusty translator, said we didn't have the money and opted to take a bus for 5000LL per person.

At the bus stop in Beirut

On the way north, we passed by the same places we visited before; Jounieh and Harissa, which I might write about in a future post. The main highway artery is right next to the sea. We shared the bus with soldiers and a classmate from Arabic. There was supposedly 1 hour wifi for free but we didn't log in successfully. I snapped more shots of the road while Ian and Dan slept. 

When we arrived at the last stop, we were a bit at loss because there was no Google Maps. But I had the tour book with me from Ibrahim, which showed that the famed Citadel was at the bank of the river, so we ambled towards the river. On the way, we passed by bazaars and busy streets.


 Now I look back at the photos, I am surprised that the architecture maintained some uniform style, even though a lot of them are dilapidated. Clearly someone put in some effort in urban planning. But I have yet to read into the history. I took a lot of photos of the landscape and buildings that had religious significance or signs because I noticed the use of calligraphy was different from the signs in Beirut. 

(Colonial) Clock tower

We stopped by a very beautiful shop with tourist ornaments on the 1st floor and generic cosmetics on the 2nd floor. The architecture was beautiful.

As we left from the bazaar area, political posters began to appear. We also looked at the Syrian street from afar.

On the way to citadel, we passed a shop that sold religious CDs and cassettes. Ian interpreted the shopkeeper's brief explanation and I remembered my anthropology Professor's work on Islamic soundscapes.

Instructional DVDs on proper conduct in Islam with English translations

Skull caps imported from Turkey

We hiked along the river a while and found a very unconventional route that took us to the foot of the citadel but not the main entrance.

#OfficiallyLost #Tripoli

We even passed by a private home right next to it. The home seemed very peaceful with lots of (stray) cats.

We passed through an ancient alleyway. It seemed as old as the citadel itself. 

After stepping over a gully that had a dead rat in them, we made it to a grave which led to a side entrance of the citadel.

Pictures of the tombstones and flowers. Very picturesque graveyard and probably the only predominantly Islamic grave I have been inside.

At this point I still have not seen anything that "makes" this place a tourist spot.  

At the darwaza of the citadel

Stray cat at the citadel

What impressed me most was the birds eye view of the city as well as the presence of the Lebanese army. We found an army post with tents in a very secluded corner of the citadel. Even after centuries, a fort will more or less function as a fort. I have not seen any similar form of army presence at the Great Wall in Beijing or the Red Fort in Delhi, which is telling about the precarity of Lebanon. A guard emerged from his tent, saw us and shooed us away from the premises. 

There were also dungeons and I was kind of spooked, afraid that there might still be dead organic matter lying around. It reminded me of some former royal places in India.

We had lunch at a normal looking joint because there was chicken roasting by the corner. Most of the people who worked and patronized there are from Syria and they also talk with Ian about his British-Syrian origins. The cashier guy was so generous and warm, when he heard how far we traveled from, he gave us falafels for free. I was a bit unwell (shang huo) and didn't want falafels; Ian was a bit annoyed with me that I didn't eat meat and thus created more issues for him in terms of solving the food logistics. But I decided to eat them anyways. 

Beautiful archways in the old part of Tripoli

At some point while we we were wandering in the bazaar, we were apprehended by some youngsters. They were hired by the soap-selling shops and wanted us to buy some soap. We entered in a courtyard with a very classic fountain, one that reminds Ian of his home in Damascus. I also saw the soap-making bucket and was impressed by the antique-style set up. One girl who worked at the same shop said she learned English from watching English television. I was shocked and finally accepted the fact that I would have to learn languages through other means. I bought two bars of soap for 12,000LL. The male shop keeper also said that he had customers from China who bought soap by the ton.


I asked the soap-seller where I could find the bookstore. He was fluent in English, had heard about the bookstore, but was not sure about where it was and thought it might be closed. I realized I might leave without visiting it. 


I also realized that most books available are very generic.

I wanted to visit a mosque but all of them were closed. So we just snapped shots outside of them. Mamluk architecture is so different from other architectural styles I have seen in the same area.

Lovely street calligraphy

We passed by this cute kid and stylish car. They look like they were headed to some event. Ian was still full of energy while Dan and I were beat. We asked several people for the directions to the bus station and many of them told us that the buses were already finished. Still, we persevered just in case there were buses left.

A tank parked on the street. We passed by an army point in the city. One officer said hello to me. Other boys on the street also notice I am Chinese and say "ni hao". Ian gets a great kick out of it; one of them chuckles in a very silly way after he said ni hao and Ian was so amused by the corniness of it all and repeats the anecdote time after time.

I also bought some string beans for 1000LL. That was definitely cheaper than what I would get in Beirut. At last we found the bus station but the last bus to Beirut indeed had left the dock. We luckily found a minivan and packed into it. The Americans we saw from the castle also joined us in the bus. We learned that most of them study about the Middle East at Harvard. But the one we talked with the most was exchanging at AUB from Georgetown University. His name was Hank.

On the way back, Hank and Ian discussed their impressions of the city.

Ian: Beirut is capitalist and divided. It's very different than Tripoli's vibe.

Hank: The latter is connected more to Damascus. It was never considered part of Mount Liban until the 1920s partition of the Ottoman Empire and official establishment of the French Mandate.
Beirut rose into prominence during the 1800s. More people came and missionaries took advantage. Western trade oriented. It was very rich until civil war.

Then the conversation shifted to the Shia neighborhood in Beirut: Hank explained that in the 1890s, Dahiya became part of Beirut. The inhabitants were mostly village people and more conservative than the heart of Beirut. Hank lived there in 2015 for several months. He also gave us a brief overview of his understanding of Syrian history: the French favored Alawis and minorities because they were part of the war zones. The Alawis suffered a lot from the late 1800s famine as well. Alawis were heavily divided in their attitudes toward the French. They were not a coherent group until the Assad family came into power. The first Assad removed religious authority and dismantled "Alawi" as a religion. The French gave them social mobility. It would have been difficult for them to achieve mobility otherwise; although there were also Alawi tax collectors (which is a relatively high social position) in 1860s.

Later I lost track of the conversation and focused on the beautiful scenery.

  

 Then we arrived in the Armenian town of Beirut; Ian, Dan and I took a bus back to the promenade close to where we lived while the others took a taxi. We arrived at the promenade just in time for the sunset. 

End note: I wrote this a bit later than I expected, and may have left out some details. Overall I should accept that blogs will not reflect experiences as they were, but rather filtered through memory and time. I really appreciated Ian's role of interpreting and guiding us, even though Dan and I also got fed up with him sometimes. The trip would not have happened if I did not have their company. My blog's readership exceeded 5000 hits last month! Thanks to all of you for reading!

A Visit to the Hizbollah Museum

 I first heard of this museum from a former airbnb roommate. Our host jibed at him for paying 4000LL as well as some souvenir money to Hizbollah, which he despised. The roommate also noted how the guide he met there personally hated Israel, which surprised him a lot. Our host said they are the worst neighbors. The conversation piqued my interest as well. 

My friend Morgana and I met at the Saifi Institute's Arabic class. She is from Peru and studies a degree related to law and humanitarianism. She is researching on Syrian refugees in Lebanon and was also interested in checking out the place. On July 29th, which was my last Saturday in Lebanon, we decided to visit the South, namely Saida and the town that hosts the famous Hizbollah museum.

We met up at 10AM, close to our institute, and we took a cab from downtown to the main long-distance bus station for South Lebanon. We only knew the name of where we were supposed to stop, namely a bridge, and relied on the other passengers to notify the moment we should descend.

We were extremely under-prepared and mostly relied on the local people to guide us to the museum. I did little research about the place. We learned mostly on the way, about the surroundings and the relation between the museum and the environs. It is known by many names: The Museum of Resistance, the Mleeta Tourist Landmark, but mostly we used the term "Hizbollah Museum" when asking for directions.

Why did we need to ask for so many directions? It was because the cab driver tried to charge us a lot for the cab fare. He said 2000 LL when in reality he meant 20,000. But by that time we were already 1/3 through the journey. He was praising Peru and China for having very good people and telling us his life story about his years in Australia and divorcing a Turkish wife back there. Then he asked if he wanted him to wait for us to drive us on the way back down. Morgana said that she would probably need 90 minutes in the museum. The driver said that 1 hour is sufficient. Then he said it would cost 40,000 LL both ways. We were shocked and decided to give him 8000 and leave the cab on the road. 
After leaving the cab, we asked a truck driver Hassan how to get up to the Hizbollah museum. He chuckled and wrote down the town name for us on the Manaoosh (Lebanese pizza) paper wrap, in case we had to ask someone else. Then he said with good humor that it would take us 1 hour to reach there by walking. We said thanks and kept on walking. A few minutes later, he drove to us with his truck and his assistant hanging on the back of the truck, telling us to get on and offering to take us to the next bus stop. We caught up on a bus and we were tailing it. Hassan tried to stop it from his position by honking.  It took the bus around 5 minutes to stop and we finally got the bus driver's attention. We took a bus up a few more steps, but then it dropped us off and took another turn to some other town. The driver was considerate enough not to charge us the fare, since we did not reach our destination. The bus route reflects that the people in the area do not visit this museum. After the bus dropped us off, I took a small detour to check out the scenic town. It reminded us of Bcharre, which was north of Beirut and the hometown of writer Khalil Gibran. We bought water there and washed some peaches. Someone offered us drinks inside but we decided to press on.


We stubbornly walked the last 4 km uphill... We later learned that it's far up because the Hizbollah fighters were fighting for it against the Israelis who occupied it during the war. 

The upside was that we had a full view of the scene as well as unique positions for the cool stuff on the way, such as these flags being placed side by side. But I definitely would not do it again. Morgana was also exclaiming: No wonder the driver wanted to charge 20,000LL!

Seeing the museum from afar

"Who comes to this museum?? Definitely only people with cars!" I complained...

We saw something protruding from the museum area for quite a while, and it was our point of reference for hiking upwards. It looked like a tank, but we found out later that it wasn't--it was a lookout point that was never detected by the Israelis during the late 1980s until Hizbollah decided to unveil it. Sometimes it was no longer in sight. When we finally made it up there, we were exhausted. We paid for our tickets at the door. The person said we should find someone with the museum logo on his shirt for an explanation of the museum layout. We found one who was tall, in his middle-age years and wore a cap and shades. He introduced the place with great confidence and experience. He said we can come back to him for any further questions. 

I did not have very high expectations even though we traversed a long distance to reach the place. I was expecting a dingy dark building, like the Stasi museum in Leipzig. But fhe museum was very informative and well-researched.

What surprised me most was that the design of the metaphors was very well thought out. The Israelis are represented by the deserted objects. "Attractive landscaping surrounds 'The Abyss,' full of booty apparently left behind in southern Lebanon after Israel's withdrawal in 2000, and after the 33-day July War in 2006." In addition to the political context, the scenery was also very nice. It seemed that many Lebanese tourists come for the view as well as for the educational value. I also was really surprised when we toured the well-equipped, "180-m tunnel leading to an operations bunker." A soldier was standing on guard at the entrance. But I later read that their presence in the museum had lessened since it first opened.

First time seeing spy equipment

Here is a description of the history reproduced by The Velvet Rocket post about the museum:

On April 3rd, 1985, the Israeli army retreated from Mount Lebanon and the villages and cities of the southern coast to an area that extends from Haasbayah and Mount Sheikh in the east, to Naqoura coastal town in the west, planting hilltops and mountaintops with dozens of fortified outposts and barracks. Soon afterwards, the resistance militants followed the enemy to its bases, to initiate the “war of bases”. From 1985 and over a period of 15 years, the resistance took Mleeta and other mountains and valleys as their strongholds, in defiance of the enemy.

So in that sense, Hizbollah is truly modern: it engaged in a war or multiple wars, in which many pauses and confusion happened in between. The result is that the history is difficult to write. 

These objects from Israeli soldiers containing Hebrew text remind me of how disconnected the two countries Lebanon and Israel are even though they are right next door. Many ancient Mediterranean trade connections were severed since the rise of the nation state.

Morgana reminisced about the time when she and her classmates were trained to be "kidnapped" in Poland for the purpose of becoming bona fide humanitarian workers. I was shocked that they had to go through that process. Later we discussed the Syrian War when we finished touring the bunker. She had the opinion that peace should be achieved in an ideal situation and only then can the Syrian society start to rebuild. I said that even in times of so-called peace, there is hegemony and oppression. I gave her the example of Gandhi and the Congress movement: even though it achieved independence for India through a peaceful movement, it also allowed for upper castes to maintain hegemony for decades. I also said that party politics happens even during times of war, i.e. how Mao built the Chinese Communist Party even when it was engaged in civil war with the Kuomintang. Similarly, FARC was trying to do that in Columbia, although with less success. Although we could have had this discussion elsewhere, we were rather exhausted to keep moving.

Later we had a very interesting political discussion with the tour guide who initially introduced us to the place. He knew about our Arabic program and said many other students from the program have visited before. Morgana asked him about the relationship between Lebanon and Palestine. He gave us a concise history: The Arab league funded the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to fight Israel. Israel did not like it and bombed Lebanon; it reached Beirut in 6 days. Then all sides fought. The PLO left Lebanon and went to Iraq and other Arab countries. But the Palestinian refugees stayed. But Israel continued to use Palestine as a reason for interfering in Lebanon. The Israelis still influenced Lebanese politics through the Phalangist party. They manipulated the politics which resulted in the election of a PM who was from that party. Speaking of the present, he said, "Some Palestinians are involved with ISIS. This is no secret." Then Morgana asked him about Syrian refugees. He said without blinking an eye, "We don't have anything to do with Syrian refugees. We are just observing them for any activity. Any conflict is between the state and the refugees." I was surprised by the shrewd reaction from him. During that week, Hizbollah was conducting military campaign against ISIS in the Lebanese town Arsal that borders Syria. They claimed that there are many ISIS militants hiding in the refugee camps. At the same time, Hizbollah also burned down areas of the camps illegally and Syrian men have died in military custody. (See this article for more details about the anti-refugee violence in Arsal.) He later was pretty nervous and decidedly changed the topic to our background and the usual meet-a-tourist talk (e.g. how China is a great country).

Morgana and I didn't really have a way to go back down. We asked a bus driver Moustafa up in the parking lot on the mountains if we could take a lift down to a town. Even though he was on duty waiting for other people, he still took us down to an intersection. On the way down he asked in Arabic about our situation and our future plans. We communicated haltingly. He chided us that we have been here for a month while learning Arabic and we still only know "shway shway!" (Meaning: a little bit) In my defense we were living in Beirut, where people spoke English very well. He left us his number in case we had any problems. Then we waited on the road for a while, until a service taxi took us to the point where we could get another service taxi. We then proceeded to tour the ancient port city Saida, which deserves another post. 

Overall, although the museum is a semblance of violence, it is not entirely a celebration of it. It shows the labor and the efforts of war in a sobering manner. There is room for reflection and contemplation for the visitors. Scholars Mona Harb and Lara Deeb have noted in their book (p63) that Hizbollah has transformed from militaristic tones to humanistic ones after some time. This plays into their plan to broaden their post- 2000 electoral base. The museum is also a form of leisure, which is a strategic area where Hizbollah can generate jobs and garner more youth support. Indeed, we met a couple on a date in the museum park area. One can disagree with Hizbollah's party politics, such as its slow disarmament process and condemn its support of the Syrian Assad regime, but at the same time it is also important to value the cultural memory of the resistance in terms of actual people with families and ties to the area. Politics often hides more violence, while this museum looks at violence and death as a necessity for survival, however grim that survival is.

For more information about this controversial museum, this is a good article: 

Hezbollah museum: Shrine to resistance or a dying image?